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Jonathan S. Masur*
ABSTRACT: Scholars and lower courts have traditionally operated under
the belief that cases involving direct tradeoffs between free speech and
national security call for the application of straightforward cost-benefit
analysis. But the Supreme Court has refused to adhere to this approach,
instead deciding difficult liberty-versus-security questions with reference to a
"probability threshold"--a doctrinal floor defining how likely a potential
threat must be in order to register in the constitutional calculus. This
doctrinal innovation has served as a necessary corrective to what would
otherwise be the systematic overestimation of speech-based threats driven by
the interaction of two factors. First, distinct informational asymmetries favor
the government, the putative censor. Second, courts and other lay risk
analysts-through the exercise of bounded rationality-tend to overstate
very low-probability, highly emotionally salient dangers.
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"Independent and impartial judges must assess the balance between protecting
our liberties and protecting our national security."
-Judge Samuel A. AlitoJr. l
"We have to deal with this new type of threat in a way we haven't yet define ....
With a low-probability, high-impact event like this ....
... If there's a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda
build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our
response ......
- Vice President Dick Cheney
I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment states that Congress "shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech,"3 but since the days of Justice Hugo
Black's absolutism,4 few have doubted that the First Amendment must yield
when its enforcement would threaten dire harm to the nation or its security.
As the Supreme Court famously remarked, the Constitution "is not a suicide
pact.",5 Likewise, the Court's canonical speech-versus-security hypothetical
that "[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent.., the
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of
,,6troops has forfeited no currency in the seventy-five years since it was
written.
Among courts and scholars, the debate over the proper balance
between speech freedoms and national security has most often centered on
the question of what framework judges should employ when deciding
whether the threat to security posed by some form of expression is so great
that the First Amendment no longer protects its utterance. In quotidian First
Amendment cases that do not involve potentially grave national harms
(cases of political speech or artistic expression, for instance), there is
certainly litde consensus or uniformity, and courts apply a variety of
methods and doctrinal rules.7 But in difficult cases that place the freedom of
1. The Judge's Only Obligation Is to the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at Al (quoting
the opening statement at now Supreme CourtJustice Alito's Senate confirmation hearing).
2. RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE 61-62 (2006) (quoting Vice President
Cheney's observations during a CIA briefing). My thanks to Cass Sunstein for bringing this
quote to my attention.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717-18 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring) ("[N]o law means no law.").
5. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
6. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
7. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2d ed. 2003);
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 12-1 to 12-39 (2d ed. 1988). Indeed, it is
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speech and the demands of national security in direct opposition, a single
leading view has emerged. The approach that has come to predominate,
both within the academy and among the lower courts-though, importantly,
not the Supreme Court-is "cost-benefit analysis," a methodological tool
borrowed from the private-law and regulatory contexts.9 This Article urges a
rethinking of this approach.
Cost-benefit analysis demands that the judge simply and
straightforwardly balance the cost of the dangerous speech-the harm that
the expression is likely to cause if it is allowed-against the benefit (a better-
informed public, for instance) one might expect the speech to produce; the
speech warrants constitutional protection if (and only if) its benefits
outweigh its costs. The aspiration for practitioners of cost-benefit analysis,
even in the realm of inchoate constitutional rights, has been to quantify
these costs and benefits to the greatest possible degree. This analysis
requires the judge to determine the approximate probability that a potential
speech-borne threat will materialize, estimate the magnitude of the damage
that threat might cause, and multiply the probability and magnitude to
arrive at the expected outcome of permitting the speech to occur. This
outcome is then compared with the benefit that the judge expects the
speech to confer. Consider, for instance, the publication of the sailing date
of a troop transport, as mentioned above. If the government asserts that a
newspaper publication of this date would create a five-percent probability
that a submarine will sink the transport, and if the transport carried one
hundred people, then the likely outcome of allowing publication of its
sailing date will be five deaths. Only if the speech is worth more than five
lives will the Constitution protect it.
This view of the First Amendment is not entirely without controversy.10
Nonetheless, one fact has become inescapable: cost-benefit analysis is
ascendant within both the lower courts and the legal academy, and courts
now decide cases that arise at the intersection of individual liberty and
national security almost exclusively with reference to such a weighing of
interests." This development is hardly surprising given the intuitive appeal
of the approach. It would be a strange constitutional doctrine indeed that
the taxonomy of these cases-their categorization as one type or another-that is most
frequently decisive to the analysis. STONE ET AL., supra, at 18.
8. See infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 11, 13-16 and accompanying text.
10. Some commentators reject this essentially consequentialist view in favor of an
approach that draws more substantially upon deontological moral and philosophical norms. See,
e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, Is THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 55-81 (2005); David A.
Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 334, 352-60 (1991).
11. See, e.g., Center for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 925-27
(D.C. Cir. 2003); N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 208-09 (3d Cir. 2002);
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 705 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Progressive,
Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 993 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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forced courts to allow behavior that proves, in the aggregate, harmful (or
even very harmful) to the nation's interests.
Yet somehow the First Amendment has tread a different path-a
desirable one, as this Article will assert. First Amendment doctrine, as
expounded by the Supreme Court, contains within it a peculiar twist, a
previously unnoticed determination not to conduct unadulterated cost-
benefit analysis. Where one might expect the First Amendment to advocate
straightforward balancing-benefits versus harms-the doctrine instead
inserts what this Article will refer to as a "probability threshold": a lower
boundary on how likely a potential harm must be in order for that harm to
register in the constitutional calculus, regardless of the harm's magnitude. If
an event is so unlikely that the probability that it will occur does not cross
this threshold, First Amendment doctrine instructs courts to refuse to weigh
the expected harm from the event against the benefits that the speech in
question is likely to produce. True balancing-a full accounting on each
side of the ledger-simply will not take place unless the probability of the
asserted harm crosses the threshold.
Consider a variant of this "troop transport" hypothetical. A magazine
seeks to publish an article describing the production of a nuclear weapon,
and the government estimates that the slight aid this article might provide to
a terrorist group seeking to develop such a weapon will increase the
likelihood that New York City and its 10 million residents are destroyed in a
nuclear blast by a probability of 1 in 2 million (0.00005%). Again, the
statistically expected outcome is five deaths. But here the threat is of such
miniscule probability that it likely falls below the probability threshold, and
therefore, it cannot serve as justification for censoring the article, regardless
of how devastating such an attack would be. Threats that straightforward
cost-benefit balancing would treat as equivalent fare very differently under
the probability threshold.
This Article thus urges a rethinking of the approach that scholars and
lower courts have taken to this crucial class of speech-versus-security cases.
Moreover, the Article attempts to account for such a significant (though
well-hidden) anomaly within such a venerable doctrine. In so doing, it turns
to behavioral law and economics for insight into the cognitive processes that
surround these instances of constitutional decision-making. The "probability
threshold" may at first glance appear dramatically over-inclusive, denying
the government the constitutional authority to combat highly dangerous,
highly unlikely threats that speech might trigger. But the institutional
relationship between the courts and the executive, and indeed the very
nature of low-probability dangers, renders such a threshold a necessary
corrective to what would otherwise be systematic overestimation of speech-
borne perils.
As the Article explains below, three mutually reinforcing factors
conspire to exaggerate the importance of low-probability, high-magnitude
1297
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threats. First, the government-in its joint role as both partisan litigant and
ostensible purveyor of neutral information-will tend to inflate the risks,
particularly the low-probability risks, posed by the speech it attempts to stifle.
The history of the government's efforts to curb undesired speech is
characterized by such exaggerations. Second, individuals-both judges and
jurors-have a propensity to overvalue the danger of low-probability risks
and ignore many differences in low-probability estimates, resulting in a
willingness to undergo irrational, disproportionate sacrifices in order to
eliminate risks that threaten little actual harm. Finally, dreadful, salient, and
emotionally resonant threats will trigger more powerful reactions than
quotidian dangers that present the same degree of harm. Low-probability,
high-magnitude speech harms are by their very nature likely to assume
dreadful forms-wars, riots, revolutions, and especially acts of terrorism
stand as the prototypical consequences of inflammatory speech. The
probability threshold exists to curb our inclination to overvalue these low-
probability threats and to deter the over-suppression of speech that might
otherwise result.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Parts II and III are purely
descriptive: Part II describes the probability threshold mathematically and
analyzes the types of potential threats that it will exclude from consideration
under the First Amendment. Part III locates the probability threshold within
several of the speech doctrines and notes that a probability threshold is most
likely to exist where borderline constitutional speech carries with it the
potential for causing significant harm--those cases that most pointedly
demand cost-benefit analysis. Parts IV and V are both positive and
normative: Part IV approaches the cost-benefit balancing questions at hand
from the standpoint of behavioral law and economics and concludes that
probability thresholds are both explicable and defensible as a crude
response to systematic upward biases in courts' assessments of the
probability that putative harms will occur. Part V also attempts to quantify
the probability threshold as a matter of orders of magnitude-the greatest
degree of possible precision. Part V defends probability thresholds as a
second-best corrective and describes the decisional errors that result when
courts fail to guard against their tendency to overvalue extremely low-
probability dangers.
This Article intends to open the domain of constitutional law to a
search for probability thresholds (or other signs of the influence of
intuitions into the cognitive), not to close it. Probability thresholds may well
exist within a variety of heretofore unexamined legal doctrines, such as
equal protection.12 More generally, it is likely that intuitive conceptions of
behavioral economics and cognitive science-intuitions that predate much
of the modern literature on these topics-have left their mark across a
12. See infra notes 271-72.
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variety of areas of public and private law. Further research holds the
potential to reveal and illuminate these cognitive echoes.
II. EXPECTATIONS OF HARM AND THE PROBABILITY THRESHOLD
Over the course of the past several decades, cost-benefit analysis has
assumed a prominent place within both the academic literature and public
and private decision-making apparatuses as an essential-if not the
dominant-analytical tool for selecting which policies to pursue and which
activities to permit. Cost-benefit analysis has long been prevalent within both
the domains of private law13 (torts, property, contracts, and the like) and
public regulation,14 where since 1981 a series of executive orders has
mandated that administrative agencies conduct cost-benefit analyses of all
significant proposed regulations.1 5 As the art and science of cost-benefit
analysis have evolved, the doctrine's applicability has spread from more
economic questions of regulation and financing to less easily monetized
subjects, including classical, individual, negative constitutional rights. One
commentator has suggested that the doctrinal test of "strict scrutiny," which
appears in various constitutional contexts, implicitly incorporates a cost-
benefit analysis.' 6 And cost-benefit analysis has achieved a significant
foothold in the doctrine surrounding the First Amendment freedom of
speech.
There exist a number of doctrinal levers by which cost-benefit analysis
may be shoehorned into First Amendment cases. The legal doctrine may
explicitly or implicitly call for a balancing of harms and interests, 17 or it may
demand "heightened" or "strict" scrutiny and require the government to
demonstrate a "compelling interest" in the form of a benefit realized or a
harm avoided before the government may curtail speech.I1 Most
importantly, certain speech doctrines require that an exercise of the right
(an act of speech or the publication of a magazine, for instance) not
13. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (7th ed. 2003);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003).
14. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255 (2002)
(discussing government adoption of public regulation of arsenic in drinking water).
15. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Exec. Order No. 12,498,
50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (Jan. 4, 1985); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981);
see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 487-88 (2003) (discussing President Reagan's
deployment of cost-benefit analysis to support a "primarily antiregulatory agenda").
16. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REv. 54, 78-79 (1997).
17. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526-35 (2001) (explicitly employing a
balancing approach in deciding a First Amendment issue); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-68
(1976) (same); Miller v. City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (same), rev'd sub nom., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
18. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 777-88 (2002); Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,196-211 (1992).
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threaten more than an acceptable amount of harm; the outcome of the
action must fall within acceptable limits.' 9 An action with expected
consequences that exceed that limitation is rejected as constitutionally
unprotected. 20 This Article focuses upon this final type of doctrinal hook, as
it is within that structure that one finds the "violence" cases-those that most
directly weigh the value of expression against its ostensible antagonists:
security and safety.
A. STANDARD COST-BENEFIT BALANCING AND PROBABILITY-MAGNITUDE CURVES
In order to describe the operation of the probability threshold (and to
explain the types of threats it excludes from consideration under the First
Amendment), a brief foray into the most basic technicalities of cost-benefit
analysis is necessary here. In economic terms, the expected utility (Hs) of
prohibiting speech is the product of the magnitude (Ms) of the harm to be
avoided and the probability (Ps) that this harm will come to pass in the
presence of speech:
H, = Ms x P,
This probability must, of course, be measured against the baseline
chance of an event occurring in the absence of government intervention.
For instance, imagine that in the middle of a war there is a .50 probability
that a troop transport will be sunk if a local newspaper is allowed to publish
the date and time on which it sails. Suppose, moreover, that there is a .15
probability that it will nevertheless be sunk if the newspaper is not permitted
to publish the relevant information. The value to the government is thus:
(.50-.15) x M, = .35 x Ms
Or, more generally:
H s = (M, x Ps) - (MN x P)
where P, and MN are, respectively, the probability and magnitude of harm if
the speech act does not occur. Of course, in most cases, a potentially
dangerous form of expression will threaten to trigger a variety of negative
outcomes. So, to generalize further:
H, = Yj (mi x P )- (Mi x Pj)
19. See infra Part II.A-B.
20. The second and third of these doctrinal incorporations are best conceived as variants
of the first; in each case, the value of the constitutional right-which is often difficult or
impossible to measure on a case-by-case basis-is set at a fixed level, and the court measures the
expected harm against that baseline.
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where M. and P, represent all of the possible states of harm in the post-
speech world and M and P the possible states of harm in the non-speech or
pre-speech universe. For instance, the publication of the sailing date of a
troop transport might increase the probability that the transport is sunk by
0.01%; increase the probability that it is attacked (at the cost of several lives)
but does not sink by 1%; and increase the probability that it is attacked
(without loss of life) but diverted off course by 10%. Each of these potential
outcomes comes with a cost of some magnitude; all are relevant to the cost-
benefit calculation and should be amalgamated.
This economic conception fits within the doctrine: the government
holds the most "compelling" interest in an action that would, with great
probability, avoid (or cause) an event of tremendous harm (or benefit).
With an idea of what fixed level of "interest" would overcome a given
constitutional freedom, a court might establish a relatively systematic means
of determining which governmental actions it would permit to proceed.
Imagine that there exists a certain quantifiable threshold of expected harm
(C) such that the government has a compelling interest in avoiding any
expected harms greater than or equal to C. To state matters in the simplest
possible terms, the government would thus be justified in suppressing
speech when H, > C, or in other words when:
Ms x PS > C
Dividing each side by Ms, we see that the government may
constitutionally ban speech if and only if:
Ps > C / Ms
This equation explains the relationship that must exist between the
expected probability and the expected magnitude of a threat in order for
the government to have a constitutional license to curtail speech in order to
prevent that threat from materializing. But more revealing than this
equation alone is its graph:
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Figure 1: Probabilities and Magnitudes of Harm Surpassing Some Fixed "Interest" Level
Magnitude of Harm
All governmental actions curtailing threatening speech that fall above
and to the right of the line (in the shaded area) would be constitutionally
permissible, while those below and to the left would be prohibited. Because
of the form of the equation for Hs, the line that separates prospective harms
against which the government may act and those against which it may not
assumes the form of y = l/x, where the y-axis range ends at absolute
certainty (100%) and the x-axis domain extends as far as the value of all life
21
and property on earth (theoretically the greatest possible harm).
B. LONG PROBABILITY TAILS AND THE PROBABILITY THRESHOLD
We might well expect courts to decide First Amendment cases-and
likewise expect First Amendment doctrine to conform-to the
straightforward economic logic summarized above. This is how many
commentators have described courts as behaving.22 This is how many
21. The typical example is of a speech act triggering a thermonuclear war that in turn
destroys all civilization and life on the planet. Richard Posner conservatively estimates the value
of such an "extinction event" at $600 trillion. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND
RESPONSE 170 (2004).
22. For a small sampling of this literature, see, for example, Neil K. Komesar, Taking
Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366,
408-09 (1984); RIchard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54
STAN. L. REv. 737, 738-42 (2002); Mark C. Rahdert, The First Amendment and Media Rights During
Wartime: Some Thoughts After Operation Desert Storm, 36 VILL. L. REv. 1513, 1517-18 (1991); ShiraJ.
Schlaff, Using an Eruv to Untangle the Boundaries of the Supreme Court's Religion Clause Jurisprudence,
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commentators believe courts should behave."3 Indeed, for areas of the law
that (explicitly or implicitly) demand an accounting of the harm that might
result from speech, it is hard to envision what alternative path the courts
might follow.
Yet First Amendment doctrine has not held so neatly to this approach.
The seed of the doctrine's peculiar deviation from standard cost-benefit
estimation lies in a particularly potent feature of the mathematical structure
of cost-benefit calculation. The magnitude-probability curve represented
above is asymptotic at very large harm magnitudes along the probability = 0
axis (the "x" axis): as the magnitude of a threat approaches infinity, the
corresponding probability necessary to constitutionally actuate that harm
approaches zero. On any such curve, "there is a long tail-tiny probabilities
of extremely catastrophic outcomes. " 24 And in the case of extremely large
harms-a significant act of terrorism such as the assassination of the
president, for instance-the cost-benefit model predicts that the First
Amendment would allow for the censorship of speech even when the
expected probability'of that harm occurring is very small.
The speech doctrines have not adhered unfailingly to that model,
however. To the contrary, in many areas the Supreme Court has imposed a
bar against asserting extremely low-probability harms as the basis for
curtailing expression, regardless of the magnitude of the harm.2  First
Amendment doctrine embodies what I here term a "probability threshold," a
limitation on how small the probability of a potential harm may be before it
5 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 831, 877-78 (2003); Rodney A. Smolla, Free the Fortune 500! The Debate over
Corporate Speech and the First Amendment, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1277, 1278 n.ll (2004); cf
GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798
TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 546 (2004). This is the case even among those commentators who
advocate a "thumb on the scale" in favor of speech on account of behavioral tendencies to
overestimate harm. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAwS OF FEAR 218-23 (2005); Paul Horwitz, Free
Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1,
27-49 (2003).
23. For a small sampling of this literature, see generally Matthew D. Adler & Eric A.
Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999). See alsoJames A. Goldston et al.,
A Nation Less Secure: Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 409, 444
(1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1654 (1999); cf
Richard A. Posner, The Speech Market and the Legacy of Schenck, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT 125-26
(Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002). Judge Posner writes the cost-benefit equation
to state that speech should be allowed if and only if B * pH/(1 + d) + 0 - A, where B is the
benefit to be realized from speech, p and H are the probability and magnitude of the potential
harm that speech may cause, 0 is the offensiveness of the speech, A is the cost of administering
the speech ban, and the (1 + d)' factor represents the temporal discounting. The model
employed in this Article subsumes 0 and A within the harm calculation and brackets the issue
of discounting; in all other respects, it is identical to Posner's.
24. W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce Terrorism
Risks, 26J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 99, 101 (2003). Note that there is no similarly long tail of low-
magnitude, high-probability events, as the probability of any occurrence is bounded at "1."
25. See infra Part III.
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loses constitutional significance and can no longer serve as a rationale for
suppressing speech activities. Events whose probabilities cannot be
definitively fixed, and whose likely probabilities fall beneath this threshold,
are simply not cognizable under First Amendment doctrine. The
government may not assert them as a justification for censorship of
26
otherwise protected speech .
Figure 2: Probabilities and Magnitudes of Harm Surpassing
Some Fixed "Interest" Level and Degree of Certainty
Magnitude of Harm
Figure 2 describes this doctrinal phenomenon. The horizontal line that
intersects the probability-magnitude function represents the minimum
probability threshold that an event must cross in order to qualify as a
judicially cognizable interest for purposes of constitutional review. Events
that lie above and to the right of the probability-magnitude curve and above
this line (the darker gray shaded area) still constitute compelling
governmental interests or dangers significant enough to place speech
outside of the protected realm. However, extremely dangerous harms of
extraordinarily low probability27 (the lighter gray area below the line) are
now entirely foreclosed as bases for overcoming constitutional rights. A
potential speech-generated harm H, holds no constitutional significance
when:
26. See infra Part III.
27. Part III, infra, examines the rhetoric defining how low a probability must be for it to
fall beneath the threshold.
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(1) P <6
Again, here P, is the probability of harm and 8 is, per the usual convention, a
very small number.
Additionally, the probability that a speech-triggered harm will
materialize must be unknown to some degree-the analysis must exist in the
domain of uncertainty, not risk:"8
(2) P. uncertain
This assumption is unlikely to disturb the analysis. The content and
context of expression-like the harms that it threatens-are so widely
divergent from episode to episode, and constitutionally dangerous speech
occurs so infrequently, that it is impossible to group speech acts into
sufficiently homogenous categories to make statistical analysis of historical
events possible and enable genuine risk evaluation of First Amendment
events.29
III. PROBABILITY THRESHOLDS IN SPEECH DOCTRINE
Contrary to what traditional cost-benefit analysis would predict and
demand, probability thresholds have found their way into the depths of First
Amendment analysis. Advocates of cost-benefit analysis in speech cases do
not believe that such balancing must occur explicitly in every individual case.
They postulate that years of doctrinal evolution have created a settled core
of First Amendment rules that already incorporate the insights that cost-
benefit analysis might provide; the doctrine has already achieved optimality,
and so balancing need not take place "at retail."3 ° Only at the periphery of
speech law, in difficult cases that test the value of speech against a strong
countervailing interest-typically an interest in safety and security-should
we expect to find explicit cost-benefit analysis. So, too, in these types of
cases, and within the doctrines that govern them, do we find probability
thresholds.
The speech doctrines that govern violence-inducing expression-"clear
and present danger," incitement, 32 and their cousin, "fighting words" 3 -all
28. See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RIsK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921). The
importance of this assumption will become clear in Part III. In short, the likely harm from an
event of known probability is easily quantifiable and could be measured against any desired
baseline without fear of systematic bias.
29. See id. at 197-232 (describing the operation of true uncertainty).
30. Posner, supra note 22, at 740.
31. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
32. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (per curiam).
33. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
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demand that hypothetical harms reach a meaningful level of certainty
before the courts will permit any speech prohibition3 4 The doctrines
achieve this goal through various means, but the verbal formulations of their
"tests" have in common the requirement that the threat be foreseeable,
near-term, and demonstrably probable to some limited degree. In addition,
the law of prior restraints-a body of doctrine often invoked in these same
violence cases where even one-time publication can threaten grave harm-
imposes a probability threshold of its own. The doctrine imposes a higher
burden of proof on the government when it seeks to use theorized,
untestable, and thus potentially lower-probability future threats, rather than
contemporaneous realities, to justify restraining expression before it
35
occurs.
Clear and present danger, incitement, fighting words, and prior
restraints include within their ambit a vast swath of the most difficult and
sensitive speech cases-cases that demand careful weighing of the costs and
benefits at hand. However, where one would expect to find unadulterated
balancing, each doctrine instead interposes a probability threshold,
screening out an entire class of low-probability, high-magnitude dangers.
A. CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER, INCITEMENT, AND THE OPERA TION OF
PROBABILITY THRESHOLDS WITHIN THE "VIOLENCE" DOCTRINES
1. Brandenburg and the Modern Incitement Standard
The probability threshold's strong roots in First Amendment law are
most strikingly visible through the doctrines used to determine which types
of speech will so facilitate or instigate the doing of harm by third parties that
the government may constitutionally prohibit their expression. The
landmark cases of Brandenburg v. Ohio' and Schenck v. United States, 7 and the
famous doctrines they inaugurated, exemplify situations in which otherwise-
protected speech can become unprotected if it threatens too great a harm.
The speech at issue is implicitly understood to hold some fixed value, and
the harm it may cause is viewed in comparison to that benchmark. Yet within
these doctrines-which encompass the great majority of "harmful speech"
cases 3S-the Court has prescribed more than a straightforward cost-benefit
34. See, e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444; see also infra Part III.A.
35. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); see also infta Part III.C (discussing probability thresholds within the doctrine of
prior restraints).
36. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444.
37. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
38. Another First Amendment doctrine used to negotiate attempts to ban speech because
of its harmful consequences-and another potential locus of a probability threshold-is the
doctrine of secondary effects, which governs cases in which the government wishes to prohibit
an adult business from locating in a particular area due to the crime it may induce. See City of
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analysis based upon the speech's presumptive harm. Each doctrine
incorporates a probability threshold that bars low-probability harms from
consideration within the cost-benefit framework.
The most important law to this analysis is the modern First Amendment
doctrine of incitement, established in Brandenburg v. Ohio, because it serves
as the jurisprudential starting point for a high percentage of the harm-based
speech-prohibition cases. It arose out of the trial and prosecution of a Ku
Klux Klan leader, Brandenburg, for comments he made at a Cincinnati rally.
In the course of this rally, Brandenburg made a series of racist and anti-
Semitic remarks in which he advocated, among other things, the forced
expulsion of Jews and African-Americans from the United States.39
Overturning Brandenburg's conviction, the Supreme Court stated that
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.40
The Brandenburg test thus incorporates both subjective and objective
elements: a speaker must subjectively intend to incite lawless action, and the
speech must be objectively likely to result in such lawlessness.4'
What is most immediately remarkable about the Brandenburg standard is
that the magnitude of threatened harm holds no place in the analysis.42
Rather, the objective part of the Brandenburg test-that advocacy must be
"likely to incite or produce such [imminent, lawless] action ,43two
guidelines,44 both of which are directed toward the separation of higher-
probability harms from more inchoate, less likely, or less foreseeable
dangers. The first is the requirement that the speech be "likely to incite"
Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 314 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("What is clear is that the evidence ... must be a matter of demonstrated fact, not
speculative supposition.").
39. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446. A speech at an immediately prior rally included such
comments as "Send the Jews back to Israel," and "Bury the n . We intend to do our part."
Id. (alteration added).
40. Id. at 447.
41. Id.
42. SeeJed Rubenfeld, A Reply to Posner, 54 STAN. L. REV. 753, 758 n.23 (2002) ("In theory,
a cost-benefit analysis should be concerned, on the cost side, only with the magnitude of the
harm (with which the Brandenburg doctrine is not concerned at all) and its probability.");
Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 37 (1986)
(offering a similar description).
43. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
44. See Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger or Advocacy of
Unlawful Action?, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 209, 240-41 (noting these two requirements and adding a
third: that the law sanction only "express advocacy"). Schwartz's third requirement is of limited
relevance to the analysis here.
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violence-an explicit probability threshold that eliminates from
consideration all low-probability harms, no matter how great they may be in
magnitude.
Coupling with and reinforcing the operation of Brandenburg's
probability threshold is its second limitation: before the government may
criminalize speech, Brandenburg demands that the harm to result from the
speech be not only likely, but "imminent."45 On its face, this imminence
requirement appears illogical and unnecessary. There would seem to be
little reason to limit the universe of constitutionally cognizable harms to only
those that will materialize quickly, particularly in a technologically
sophisticated world riddled with a farrago of complex mechanical and
interpersonal interconnections. Severe dangers that emanate from advocacy,
yet germinate more gradually, might seem equally worthwhile candidates for
prohibition, modulo the temporal discounting of harm that the calculation
• 46
would have to incorporate.
Yet imminence serves also as a mechanism for weeding out uncertain
and low-probability consequences and for heightening the probabilistic and
causal connection between speech and harm that must exist before the
government may curtail advocacy. Speech harms necessarily involve the
interposition of third-party causal actors; speech cannot, by itself, poison a
drinking well or sink a troop transport. Confining the scope of cognizable
harms to those that will arise in the near future curtails speculation over
attenuated causal chains and more tightly couples speech in time, space, and
47probability to the harms it might engender. The victims of this triage are
lower-probability harms that would require additional time and opportunity
to germinate.
Brandenburg's probability threshold is not merely a matter of theory or
of loose verbal formulations that do not accurately describe the analysis they
portend. Rather, Brandenburg itself illustrates the operation of the
probability threshold that its doctrinal test installs. The Ku Klux Klan rally at
which Brandenburg spoke was attended by "12 hooded figures" who carried
firearms and described themselves as the "organizers" of a large network-
48
numbering in the hundreds-of Ku Klux Klan members in Ohio.
Brandenburg's speech thus raised the specter of at least a series of racially
motivated killings, if not the possible triggering of an entire race riot-not
45. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
46. For discussions on the importance of accurate discounting and the issues involved
therein, see W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of
Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 57 (2003); Dexter Samida &
David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting 28-29 (Univ. of Chi. Law School, John
M. Olin Program in Law & Economics Working Papers, No. 255, 2005), available at http://
www.law.uchicago.edu/law-pdf/law-econ/255.pdf.
47. See STONE, supra note 22, at 409.
48. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445-46.
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an unlikely result given Cincinnati's extensive history of calamitous racial
violence. 49 But an analysis of the magnitude of these possibilities makes no
appearance in the Brandenburg opinion; the Court concentrated only on the
likelihood that Brandenburg's speech would trigger such disasters. Since the
danger in Brandenburg did not cross the probability threshold, the Court
found it unnecessary to conduct any further inquiry.
2. Schenck, Dennis, and the Probability Threshold's Historical Roots
Brandenburg's probability threshold did not simply spring into being,
fully formed, with the decision in that case. To the contrary, its historical
roots run to perhaps the most famous doctrinal standard in all of First
Amendment law and certainly the most famous of the harmful-speech
standards: the "clear and present danger" test set forth in Justice Holmes's
seminal opinion, Schenck v. United States.s0 Schenck concerned a leaflet
circulated in 1917 during the height of World War I to all men of draft age,
urging them to take every lawful action to resist being conscripted.5' Fearing
that such a suggestion could interfere substantially with the draft-and
consequently with the war effort-the government prosecuted Charles
Schenck under the Espionage Act, triggering a case that ended in Justice
Holmes's path-breaking opinion several years later.5' "The question in every
case," explained Holmes, "is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent."
53
Holmes's "clear and present danger" rubric ruled the day for fifty years,
and it set the standard according to which dissenting speech would be
prosecuted through two world wars.54 In fact, the "clear and present danger"
test was not considered terribly protective of speech, and Brandenburgs
incitement was meant to ameliorate the condition of anti-government
speakers.55 Yet, like Brandenburg, Schenck demanded that courts scrutinize
only the likelihood that speech would trigger some harm or danger, not the
enormity or significance of the threat. The "clear and present" analysis
speaks only to the likelihood that a harm will result from the speech under
consideration-and again to the imminence of that harm-not to either the
49. See William Cheek & Aimee Lee Cheek, John Mercer Langston and the Cincinnati Riot of
1841, in RACE AND THE CITY 29-69 (Henry Louis Taylor, Jr., ed., 1993) (describing the
Cincinnati race riots of 1967); Henry Louis Taylor, Jr., Introduction: Race and the City, 1820-1970,
in RACE AND THE CITY, supra, at 19-21 (same).
50. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-9, at 841-49.
55. Id.
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extent of the threatened harm or the statistically probable damage expected
from the speech.
Even Richard Posner-an acknowledged expert on, and proponent of,
using cost-benefit analysis to decide free-speech cases-has recognized that
the "clear and present danger" test touches only upon the probability, and
not the magnitude, of the danger. Posner has explained that Holmes's
standard "requires that the probability [of harm] be high ... and the harm
imminent," and extrapolates from this that, in classical cost-benefit terms,
"the danger of harm must be great."56 But Posner goes on to admit the
central feature of the "clear and present danger" test (or, perhaps more
descriptively, the missing central feature):
Holmes's analysis of the costs of speech was incomplete in Schenck
because he focused only on the probability of harm if the speech
was allowed and not on the magnitude of the harm if it occurred;
he was looking only at one determinant of the expected harm of
57free speech.
Posner nonetheless argues that cost-benefit analysis "is part of the First
Amendment interpretive tradition.,58 Yet what Schenck reveals is not cost-
benefit analysis's historical roots but the long pedigree of probability
thresholds-and the First Amendment's exclusion of high-magnitude, low-
probability events. The imposition of a probability threshold in free-speech
analysis is not a contemporary or isolated innovation; its roots reach to the
very birth of the modern doctrines governing dangerous speech, and
probability thresholds have only grown more robust since that time.
The growth has not always been linear, however, and the Court has not
always deviated so directly from the standard cost-benefit model of First
Amendment analysis. On one prominent occasion, the case of Dennis v.
United States, a plurality of the Court did endorse a black-letter formulation
of the expected-harm calculation. 59 Yet, the eventual rejection of the Dennis
formulation in favor of a probability-threshold-incorporating legal rule
further demonstrates the hold that probability thresholds have over this
corner of First Amendment doctrine.
Dennis arose from an appeal by alleged Communist organizers of their
conviction for "knowingly or willfully advocat[ing] . . . [the] propriety of
overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or
violence .... ,60 The principal legal question confronting the Court was how
precisely to interpret the "clear and present danger" standard from Schenck,
56. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAw, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 360 (2003). Posner uses
danger to mean expected harm, i.e., the probabilistic calculation of the expected outcome.
57. Id. at 361; see also Posner, supra note 23, at 124-25; Posner, supra note 42, at 29.
58. POSNER, supra note 56, at 361.
59. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508-11 (1951).
60. Id. at 496 (quoting the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1946)).
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which it had accepted as the governing precedent. 61 In this enterprise, the
Supreme Court found itself on the receiving end of some felicitous
guidance.
ChiefJudge Learned Hand was the author of the lower court opinion in
Dennis, and he had proposed an unencumbered cost-benefit test for gauging
whether the speech should be punished: "In each case [courts] must ask
whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. Hand's
formula represents an obvious departure from a "uniform standard of
likelihood, signaled by the word 'clear,"' and toward the type of classic cost-
benefit analysis (B < PL) he developed in the context of tort negligence.63
The Supreme Court latched onto this formula without reservation: "We
adopt this statement of the rule. As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it is as
succinct and inclusive as any other we might devise at this time. It takes into
consideration those factors which we deem relevant, and relates their
significances. More we cannot expect from words. "64
If Dennis had remained the standard formulation of the law, the
probability threshold would have ceased operation. But the Dennis plurality's
approach never garnered five votes, and the story of Chief Justice Hand's
cost-benefit formula in Dennis became one of silently enforced desuetude.
Brandenburg effectively overturned Dennis only eighteen years later, and the
65
"likely to produce imminent lawless action" test has governed ever since.
The Supreme Court has cited the Dennis test only once in the thirty-six years
since it decided Brandenburg.66 The lower federal courts have cited Dennis
only a handful of times.67 At least as far as the Supreme Court's case law is
61. Id. at 508 ("In this case we are squarely presented with the application of the 'clear
and present danger' test, and must decide what that phrase imports.").
62. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
63. Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 645, 717 (1980)
(describing Dennis in cost-benefit terms); Posner, supra note 42, at 8 (same); cf United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (introducing the classic B/PL
formulation).
64. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510.
65. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 115
(1980) (arguing that Brandenburg would "have demanded the contrary result in the early
Espionage Act cases and the later Communist cases" (emphasis added)); STONE ET AL., supra note
7, at 61; Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some
Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 754 (1975) (describing Brandenburg as the Supreme
Court's "clearest and most protective standard under the first amendment" while noting that
the crucial innovation in that case was "hardly established" in prior law).
66. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
67. Bailey v. Systems Innovation, Inc., 852 F.2d 93, 98 (3d Cir. 1988); Culver v. Sec'y of the
Air Force, 559 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Gay Lib v. Univ. of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Smith, 555 F.2d 249, 253 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977); Sherling v. Townley, 464 F.2d 587
(5th Cir. 1972).
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concerned, Brandenburgs and Schenck's probability threshold, not Dennis's
straightforward cost-benefit analysis, has ruled this area of the law.
3. Brandenburg in Operation
Brandenburg does not stand in isolation as an unreplicated,
unsubstantiated doctrinal innovation. On other occasions, the Court has
demonstrated precisely how seriously it will read Brandenburg's probability
threshold. Claiborne Hardware,68 a case that dealt with threats-and in some
cases actual violence-against African Americans who refused to comply
with a boycott against white-owned businesses, provides an illustrative
example. In support of the NAACP-led boycott, Charles Evers, the NAACP
local secretary, had made a number of speeches threatening African-
American residents who continued to patronize the wrong businesses. At
one point he declared: "If we catch any of you going in any of them racist
stores, we're gonna break your damn neck."6 1 Moreover, these threats were
backed by serious actions: "In two cases, shots were fired at a house; in a
third, a brick was thrown through a windshield; in the fourth, a flower
garden was damaged."7 °
Yet the Court did not hold Evers liable for the acts of violence that
followed his speeches, and it did not even make reference to the
grievousness of the harm that might have resulted had Evers been taken at
face value. Instead, the Court pointed to the gap of "weeks or months"
between Evers's speech and these assaults, concluding from the temporal lag
that it was highly unlikely that Evers had directly incited the violence (per
Brandenburg) .7 ' A Court engaging in traditional cost-benefit analysis would
have analyzed this (perhaps) low probability72 of causation alongside the
conceivably great harm-indeed, possibly the intended harm-that Evers
could have inspired the listening crowd to inflict. The Claiborne Court did no
such thing. Once the Court determined that the putative threat did not
cross the probability threshold, further cost-benefit balancing was
unnecessary.
An even more startling example appears in Hess v. Indiana, a case that
arose from an anti-Vietnam War demonstration at Indiana University. The
68. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
69. Id. at 902.
70. Id. at 904.
71. Id. at 928.
72. The Court's estimation of harm may well have been biased improperly by hindsight.
Even if direct harm did not result from Evers's speech, it does not follow that harm was unlikely
to occur; in the context in which Evers gave the speech, it might have been quite evident to any
bystander that Evers had whipped the crowd into a violent frenzy. Of course, this issue-post
hoc examination of causation and probability-is yet another indication of the Court's heavy
emphasis on probability thresholds. See infra Part III.C (examining probability thresholds within
the doctrine of prior restraints).
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demonstration involved 100 to 150 protestors (who began by blocking traffic
on a public street) and "a large number of spectators who had gathered" toS73
watch the proceeding. As police moved to clear the protestors out of the
street, witnesses heard Gregory Hess yell out either "We'll take the fucking
street later," or "We'll take the fucking street again," precipitating his
arrest.
7 4
The terse Supreme Court record does not disclose how tense a
reasonable observer would have found the situation or how close the
demonstrators were to becoming an unruly mob capable of threatening
serious damage or injury; it may well be that the march was self-evidently
peaceful. But the Court did not even bother to consider these possibilities.
The magnitude of the potential harm from inciting a large group of
protestors did not enter its analysis. Rather, the Court placed its emphasis on
Hess's claim that he would "take the . . . street lated' (or "again") and
concluded that his speech at most "amounted to nothing more than
advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time."' 5 Citing
Brandenburg, the Court then concluded that there could be no "rational
inference from the import of [Hess's] language, that his words were
intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder. " 76 Because
the harm did not exceed Brandenburgs probability threshold, the Court's
inquiry was simply at an end. By ignoring the magnitude of the low-
probability threat posed by Evers's and Hess's speech, the Supreme Court
signaled that it would apply Brandenburgs probability threshold with
unyielding seriousness.
It would be easy to dismiss this doctrinal puzzle if its overall impact on
constitutional cost-benefit balancing were minor. But Brandenburg and
Schenck do not merely delineate an obscure corner of First Amendment law
or encompass only a minor proportion of all harm-inducing speech cases.
Rather, they provide the doctrinal legal framework for nearly every case that
7touches upon the dissemination of national secrets or national security, as
well as many cases involving speech that threaten other types of harm, such
•78
as hate speech and indecency. And, as the following Sections demonstrate,
other aspects of First Amendment law have similarly embraced doctrinal
embodiments of probability thresholds.
73. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106 (1973).
74. Id. at 107.
75. Id. at 107-08 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 109 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)).
77. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the framework would not be used only in an "extremely narrow
class of cases"); TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-9, at 841-48.
78. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (concerning cross-burning);
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 236 (2002) (concerning indecent speech harmful
to children).
1313
92 IOWA LAWREVIEW
B. "FIGHTING WORDS "AS PARALLEL IMPOSITION OFA PROBABILITY THRESHOLD
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire's "fighting words" doctrine mirrors
Brandenburg's imposition of a probability threshold. 79 The Chaplinsky test for
determining whether speech is protected, like the Brandenburg test,
incorporates two elements, both of which speak to the probability that the
speech at issue will engender some sort of harm and neither of which
touches upon the magnitude of the resulting harm. Chaplinsky criminalizes
only "those [words] which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace," or by another formulation, "the
use in a public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace."8 0 The
size or danger of this breach of the peace is orthogonal to the Chaplinsky
analysis; the only relevant factors are likelihood and, again, imminence.
Chaplinsky does contain a hint of an appreciation for the standard cost-
benefit formula. The opinion alludes to the balancing of harms and benefits
that should take place under such an algorithm, justifying its prohibition of
"fighting words" on the theory that "[i] t has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.'
But the Supreme Court never follows this with any admonition to consider
the magnitude of the harm that might result from fighting words alongside
the probability that the words will engender such a reaction. The above-
quoted phrase is thus probably better read as merely setting forth the
broader framework for these types of cases-speech is protected unless it is
likely to cause some degree of harm-than as instructing courts to take the
magnitude of threatened harm into account.
Cohen v. California, a subsequent "fighting words" case involving a man
who wore a jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft" emblazoned upon it into
a state courthouse, followed the same logic.8s The Court refused to punish
Cohen for his speech on the ground that no one who saw the jacket would
have taken it as an invitation to violence . Consequently, tangible harm-as
opposed to mere harm to a viewer's sensibilities-was unlikely to result. 
4
The Court did not consider the extent or degree of harm that Cohen's
jacket might have caused, and indeed it likely is fortunate for Cohen that it
did not. In addition to the possibility that a viewer might become enraged by
Cohen's profane expression of his viewpoint and attack him, there existed
the (remote) possibility that someone might instead be convinced by
79. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
80. Id. at 572-73.
81. Id. at 572.
82. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
83. Id. at 20.
84. Id.
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Cohen's rhetoric-"one man's vulgarity is another's lyric, 8 5 explained the
Court-and be spurred instead to unlawful draft resistance. Given the
meager value of Cohen's chosen mode of expression and the state's interest
in keeping the peace, a Court dedicated truly to balancing benefits and
harms might easily have concluded that Cohen's jacket did not pass the
test.86 But, focused as it was upon only the probability that Cohen would
incite an onlooker to violence, the Court entirely glazed over these
questions.
C. PROBABILITY THRESHOLDS WITHIN THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESTRAINTS
The doctrine of prior restraints has departed substantially from its roots
as a curb against speech-licensing schemes and professional censors and now
includes a presumptive prohibition against even judicial injunctions that
resemble post hoc punishments for speech in nearly every respect. The only
meaningful distinction between an ex ante injunction against speech and an
ex post punishment for speaking is the timing of the trial and whether it will
occur before or after the act of speech has taken place. The doctrine of
prior restraints is thus best understood as implicitly buttressing the
probability threshold: The government must sustain a heavier burden if it
wishes to prohibit speech when the negative effects of that speech are less
well-known and when the likelihood that harm will arise is lower or more
uncertain.
1. From Licensing to Judicial Injunctions
One of the most well-known and well-established First Amendment
doctrines is the heightened scrutiny that attaches to governmental efforts to
prohibit speech before it has been uttered-"prior restraints on speech" in
81the popular parlance . Many commentators have, by this point, explored
18
the historical roots of the doctrine in great depth, and little further
elaboration is necessary here. The disfavoring of prior restraints stemmed
originally from public antipathy toward the English Licensing Act of 1662,
which required all printed publications to obtain a license from a
89government censor before they could be printed and distributed .
85. Id. at 25.
86. 1 take no position here on whether the First Amendment, under any sort of balancing
scheme, ought to include these types of potentialities in the cost-benefit equation. I mean only
to indicate that the Cohen Court might have decided to do so.
87. For a canonical statement of the doctrine, see Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415, 419-20 (1971).
88. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
648, 650-52 (1955) (including sources cited therein); William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of
First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior
Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 247-49 (1982).
89. John CalvinJeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 412 (1983).
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Blackstone's famous passage that laid the groundwork for this constitutional
doctrine referred to this type of licensing scheme:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter
when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what
sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy
the freedom of the press .... 90
Scholars now widely agree that "when the first amendment was
approved by the First Congress, it was undoubtedly intended to prevent
government's imposition of prior restraints similar to the English licensing
system under which nothing could be printed without the approval of the
state or church authorities." 9' The notion of prior restraints conjures up the
swipe of the censor's pen, the shuttering of newspapers and magazines, and
a governmental vice grip on free expression that seems antithetical to the
constitutional spirit. The presumptive invalidity of prior restraints has long
been one of the First Amendment's most robust doctrines.92
The "original" types of prior restraints all involved the participation of
what amounted to an official censor, an administrative official whose sole
occupation was to pass judgment upon the permissibility of speech before
the speaker uttered it.93 Such systems may be objectionable for a number of
reasons, particularly the expectation that an official "censor" will be all too
eager to ban speech given that the laying of such restraints is precisely his
job.94
In the last century, however, the Supreme Court has extended the
presumption of unconstitutionality to a host of other structures and
90. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *152.
91. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-34, at 1039; see also Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S.
697, 713 (1931); Emerson, supra note 88, at 650-52; Mayton, supra note 88, at 247.
92. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring). Justice Black argued:
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it
must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the
governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was
abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government.
The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform
the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in
government.
Id.
93. SeeJeffries, supra note 89, at 421.
94. See id. at 421-26; cf Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA
L. REV. 407, 411-14 (1995). The litany of objections to an administrative-preclearance system is
well documented, and, for present purposes, there is no need to explore them at length. Suffice
it to say that even the harshest critics of broader prior-restraint doctrines accept the validity of
the doctrine in that context.
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activities, most notably (and most peculiarly) the purely judicial imposition
of injunctions against speech. Despite the antipathy with which courts have
traditionally regarded prior restraints, it is not immediately evident what evil
is brought into being by ajudicial injunction that is not similarly summoned
by traditional post hoc punishment (trial and conviction) for the same
speech.96 A governmental threat to punish a speaker after she has spoken
will, in many cases, deter speech just as effectively as an outright ex ante
prohibition on that speech.97 The only difference lies in the timing: "Under
a system of injunctions, the adjudication of illegality precedes publication;
under a system of criminal prosecution, it comes later."
98
Yet it is precisely this question of timing that explains the heightened
scrutiny applied to prior restraints on speech. At its core, the doctrine of
prior restraints serves as a buttress to the First Amendment's probability
threshold, screening out lower-probability harms through the requirement
that the government may not penalize speech until it has already occurred-
except under very selected circumstances and even when that penalty
involves only an injunction.
Before continuing, it will be useful to review the functioning of prior
restraints on speech (by comparison with their less-disfavored cousin, post
hoc criminal enforcement) and the consequences for the speaker under
each type of regulation. In rare cases, when the government seeks and
obtains an injunction 9 on speech, the remedy will involve actual physical
restraints upon the speaker: police might shutter newspapers, put printing
presses under lock-and-key, refuse to rent out a generally available
municipal theater,9 9 or even close a parade route through strength-of-arms.
95. See, e.g., Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of
Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1989).
96. For instance, "Judges are not perfect; sometimes they may err on the side of
suppression and enjoin speech without sufficient justification. But the fact remains that judges,
unlike professional censors, have no vested interest in the suppression of speech." Jeffries, supra
note 89, at 426-27.
97. See, e.g., id. at 427-30 (noting that post hoc punishment is very similar in structure to
an injunction against speech and, in fact, may chill a broader swath of conduct); Scordato, supra
note 95, at 15-16 ("Taken as a whole, this analysis strongly suggests that laws traditionally
characterized as prior restraints are no more likely to produce a greater or more effective
chilling effect on constitutionally protected speech than laws traditionally characterized as
subsequent sanctions.").
98. Jeffries, supra note 89, at 428.
99. The following discussion concerns only injunctive remedies obtained in court and not
any types of administrative-licensing schemes, which are objectionable for a multitude of
unrelated reasons. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the term "prior
restraint," wherever it is subsequently used in this paper, should be understood to describe only
injunctions against speech.
100. See, e.g., Se. Promotions., Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547-48 (1975) (concerning the
musical "Hair").
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But far more typically, a prior restraint takes the form of a court-issued
injunction against the speech-a piece of paper.10
Before a court may impose an injunction, it must consider whether the
activity that the government seeks to enjoin is protected by the Constitution,
and the putative speaker must be given the opportunity to contest the
injunction (and its constitutionality) in court.' °2 If the court issues an
injunction and if the speaker then disobeys the injunction by performing
the banned speech act, the government (and the court) can enforce the
injunction through contempt sanctions.'0 3 At this post-speech contempt
proceeding, the only issue is whether the speaker did, in fact, violate the
terms of the injunction. According to the collateral-bar rule, the speaker can
no longer argue that her speech was constitutionally protected-her only
opportunity to make this argument came and went when the court issued
the injunction.
10 4
By comparison, when a prior restraint on speech is not permitted or
obtained, the speaker may be prosecuted after the speech occurs in a
traditional criminal trial.10 5 At this trial, the speaker is (of course) permitted
to argue that her speech was protected by the First Amendment. 0 6
The two situations are thus congruent in nearly every respect. Under
each enforcement mechanism, one substantive hearing will take place.'0 7
Under either enforcement mechanism, the speaker is given one opportunity
to argue that her speech is constitutionally protected.' And the intended
outcome (from the point of view of the court and the government) under
either regime is identical. The punishment for uttering prohibited and
unprotected speech ostensibly is set at the level necessary to deter such
speech; under either condition, the legal system anticipates that
unprotected speech will not take place.'0 9
101. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Near
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson., 283 U.S. 697, 704-05 (1931); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467
F. Supp. 990, 993 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
102. See, e.g., Near, 283 U.S. at 705 ("The defendants demurred to the complaint upon the
ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and on this demurrer
challenged the constitutionality of the statute.").
103. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 319-21 (1967).
104. See TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-35, at 1042 & n.2.
105. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-45 (1969) (per curiam); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 48-49 (1919).
106. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445.
107. The contempt proceeding is by nature abbreviated, since there remains only one live
issue.
108. This means only one opportunity before the trial court. In either case the speaker may
appeal the trial court's decision-either the decision to grant the injunction under the prior-
restraint regime or the conviction in the post hoc punishment regime-to the court of appeals
and eventually, perhaps, to the Supreme Court.
109. This assumes, of course, that the speaker can gauge, ex ante, the probability that her
speech will be prohibited; errors in this estimation may well lead to over- or underdeterrence.
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Moreover, if the speaker truly values her ability to speak more than her
freedom from punishment, she can always elect to violate an injunction that
has been put in place and to accept the consequences. An injunction against
speech-particularly, as is the case quite frequently, when the speech is a110
one-off event -functions more as a liability rule than it does as a property
rule."'' Even after an injunction issues, the speaker is not truly barred from
speaking. The speaker retains the option of simply continuing with the act
of speech and accepting the subsequent punishment. As when the
government may prosecute speech only after the fact, the speaker is offered
a choice between punishment and silence. The only incongruity rests with
the fact that, in the prior-restraint situation, the speech has not taken place
yet, whereas in the post hoc punishment situation, it has. The selection of
one or the other regime would appear to devolve into merely whether it is
less costly to have the trial sooner or later.
2. Prior Restraints as Certainty-Forcing Devices
Yet, despite this apparent parallelism, a prior restraint on speech must
overcome "a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity," l 2 and the
government "carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the
imposition of such a restraint."" 3 The Supreme Court has read into the First
Amendment a strong constitutional preference for allowing speech to occur
and punishing the speaker (if called for) only afterward. 1 4 Commentators
have struggled to identify the basis for this preference, which, as described
above, is both historic and contemporary.'1 5 Among the numerous
explanations offered," 6  the most plausible, the most rationally
The goal nevertheless remains to achieve perfect deterrence, and the legal sanction is
presumably calibrated (to the extent possible) toward this end.
110. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam);
United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 993 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
111. Cf Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111-12 (1972). Per Calabresi and
Melamed's dichotomy, this is to say that a speaker need not bargain with the party who has
obtained the injunction for a release of that injunction before speaking. She may simply speak
and then absorb the punishment for having done so. Id.
112. N.Y Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963) and citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)).
113. Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
114. Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11,
11(1981).
115. See generally id.; Howard 0. Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint
Doctrine: A Reply to Professor Mayton, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 283 (1982); Jeffries, supra note 89;
Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L.
REV. 53 (1984); Scordato, supra note 95.
116. See supra note 115 (cataloging an extensive list of possible explanations, none
particularly compelling for reasons stated within the sources themselves).
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instrumentalist, and the most widely accepted is an antipathy toward
"adjudication in the abstract."' 17
When the trial occurs before the speech has been uttered, the court is
forced to speculate prospectively about the harm that the speech will
cause-or at least to speculate with less information than it would possess
had the speech already occurred.'1 8 Even if the harm that might emanate
from speech germinates sufficiently slowly that it has not yet arisen by the
time the speaker is put on trial, the court will still have before it valuable
information that the court would not possess when deciding whether to
impose a prior restraint: the precise tone and context in which the speech
was delivered, some picture of the effect that it had upon listeners, a set of
initial reactions to the speech, and some idea of the short-term ramifications
of the speech.1 9 Consequently, under a prior-restraint regime, an entire
universe of speculative, low-probability harms-threats that might never have
had a chance of occurring and that would therefore prove baseless once the
speech took place-could gain constitutional purchase. As one scholar
explains:
[I]f the governing first amendment test for the speech at issue is
one that turns on consequences (clear and present danger, for
example), the necessity for speculation permits groundless fears to
figure in the rationale for suppression. If the judgment were made
at a later stage, the data from initial dissemination could on
occasion serve to dispel such fears.
20
The law of prior restraints thus serves the First Amendment's probability
threshold, weeding out a category of low-probability threats and applying an
upward bias to the certainty of all governmental justifications presented in
support of speech restrictions.
The Supreme Court has described its doctrine of prior restraints as a
check against low-probability speculation, lending further support to the
117. Blasi, supra note 114, at 49-54; see alsoJeffries, supra note 89, at 430 n.67 ("Professor
Blasi's analysis of these factors is both thoughtful and thought-provoking.... In my view, the
strongest of these arguments goes under the heading of 'adjudication in the abstract.'");
Redish, supra note 115, at 66-69 ("Perhaps the strongest argument against judicial prior
restraint is that because such a restraint is imposed prior to the actual dissemination of
expression, a court's first amendment ruling will necessarily be made in the abstract without any
knowledge of the actual effect of the challenged expression.").
118. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) ("We can never forecast
with certainty; all prophecy is a guess, but the reliability of a guess decreases with the length of
the future which it seeks to penetrate.").
119. See Blasi, supra note 114, at 49-51. The executive certainly need not wait until the
harm has actually occurred before punishing someone for a speech act. See generally, e.g., Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). But even if it is the case that post hoc trial and
punishment will frequently occur "in the abstract," see Redish, supra note 115, at 68-69, at least
the court will have before it much more information than it did before the speech took place.
120. Blasi, supra note 114, at 49.
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notion that it was indeed intended to function as a probability threshold. The
most illuminating modern Supreme Court exposition on prior restraints
comes from New York Times Co. v. United States, the so-called Pentagon Papers
case, which overturned a lower court's injunction against the Times's
publication of the Papers. 2 ' The perfunctory per curiam opinion in this case
relied predominantly upon the disfavor attached to prior restraints of
speech, stating that "[t]he Government thus carries a heavy burden of
showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint" and concluding
that the government "had not met that burden.' 22 Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion offers a more robust description of the presumption
against prior restraints, grounding the government's burden of proof in the
obligation to adduce evidence of probable, foreseeable dangers if speech is
permitted, rather than merely uncertain hypotheses and speculation as to
potential harms. Justice Brennan explained, "[T]he First Amendment
tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon
surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result.
12 3
According to Justice Brennan, this stringent presumption against
speech restraints in the face of uncertainty or low-probability events extends
to even the most serious of wartime situations, such as the aforementioned
example of a newspaper that seeks to publish the dates and times of the
sailing of troop transports. "[O]nly governmental allegation and proof that
publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of
an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can
support even the issuance of an interim restraining order."' 24 Again, the
requirements of directness and immediacy (much like Brandenburg's
imminence requirement) are coupled with "inevitably," a straightforward
appeal to likelihood; the three words together direct a court to focus
specifically on the probability of harm, relegating calculations of a harm's
magnitude to a second tier.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, joined by Justice White, contains
similar language. Justice Stewart states: "But I cannot say that disclosure of
any of them will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage
to our Nation or its people. That being so, there can under the First
Amendment be but one judicial resolution of the issues before us. "125 Two-
thirds of Justice Stewart's verbal formulation is directed explicitly at
probabilities-the harm must be "direct" and "immediate," meaning that
the causal chain must be clear and, thus, the prospect of harm more easily
121. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
122. Id. at 714 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
123. Id. at 725-26 (Brennan,J. concurring) (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 726-27 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 730 (StewartJ, concurring).
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gauged. 126 The third requirement, that the harm be "irreparable," may seem
upon initial inspection to invoke the magnitude of the danger. But it does
not actually reference magnitude, only whether a harm can be corrected or
undone. More importantly, it appears within the context of the
government's request for an injunction, and a party seeking an injunction
traditionally must demonstrate that it risks irreparable harm if the act to be
enjoined is allowed to take place. 127 (Why would an injunction be necessary
if the harm from the act could be remedied fully after the fact?) Justice
Stewart's use of the word "irreparable" is thus far more likely a reference to
this injunctive requirement than a serious effort to incorporate a measure of
magnitude into the analysis.
Equally telling is the government's suggested-and rejected-standard:
"[T] hat the President is entitled to an injunction against publication of a
newspaper story whenever he can convince a court that the information to
be revealed threatens 'grave and irreparable' injury to the public interest."1 28
This standard speaks explicitly-and exclusively-to the magnitude of harm
threatened; so long as the potential injury is "grave," the Court need not
even inquire into the probability that it will occur. 12 The fact that all of the
Justices refused to operate pursuant to such a doctrinal formulation 3 lays
bare their focus upon the likelihood that the government's alleged harms
would come to pass and, in particular, their intent to test each asserted harm
against a meaningful probability threshold.
1 3 1
126. N.Y Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
127. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambel, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 540 (1987).
128. N.Y Times Co., 403 U.S. at 732 (White, J., concurring). For at leastJustices White and
Stewart, a large part of the weakness of the government's case stemmed from this untenable
standard it suggested. See id. ("Much of the difficulty inheres in the 'grave and irreparable
danger' standard suggested by the United States.").
129. It is conceivable that by "grave" the government meant instead a proper cost-benefit
analysis of the statistically expected harm, as measured by the product of its magnitude and
probability. Yet, were this the case, it would lend further credence to the argument set forth in
the text above, as the Court would have rejected not merely an unworkable and shortsighted
doctrinal formula that focused exclusively on a harm's magnitude but, instead, a genuine
attempt to perform classical cost-benefit analysis.
130. There is no doubt that this choice was squarely before the Justices. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S.
at 732 (White,J., concurring).Justice White wrote:
The Government's position is simply stated: The responsibility of the Executive for
the conduct of the foreign affairs and for the security of the Nation is so basic that
the President is entitled to an injunction against publication of a newspaper story
whenever he can convince a court that the information to be revealed threatens
.grave and irreparable" injury to the public interest ....
Id.
131. In parallel with the violence doctrines, this probability threshold is not a modern
innovation. The canonical case on prior restraint-Near v. Minnesota-describes the doctrine in
significantly less detail but similarly announces that only high-probability threats will trump the
Court's baseline antipathy toward prior restraint. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697,
716 (1931). The Court wrote in Near, "[T]he protection even as to previous restraint is not
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IV. GOVERNMENT EXAGGERATION, AVAILABILITY HEURISTICS,
AND THE PERILS OF Low PROBABILITIES: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT OF
PROBABILITY THRESHOLDS
At first blush, the First Amendment's imposition of these probability
thresholds reads as a doctrinal error-a court-made failure to adopt a verbal
formulation that accurately encompasses the weighing of the harms and
benefits of speech that this area of the law would seem to require. But the
reality is not so straightforward.
Three mutually reinforcing factors conspire to inflate the value of low-
probability threats in the judicial calculus, threatening systematic
overestimation of the costs of incendiary speech and, thus, serving as
potential justification for imposing probability thresholds. First, the
government, which in these cases finds itself always in the role of censor, has
incentives to overstate the harm that speech might cause. 13 The historical
record is replete with examples of governmental overestimation, intentional
and otherwise. The risk that the government will overvalue the potential for
harm-and that the court will accept this overvaluation-is particularly
acute in the case of low-probability harms, which are easier for the
government to invent, harder to disprove, and less susceptible to reasoned
analysis or contradiction.
Second, as explained below, individuals tend to systematically overvalue
the statistical threat posed by low-probability harms. 133 In study after study,
respondents have demonstrated a willingness to pay more to avoid low-
incidence dangers than they would to avoid higher-probability harms that
threaten statistically equivalent damage. 134 Laypeople are also surprisingly
insensitive to variations in small probabilities. Many-fold decreases in the
chance that a harm will materialize do not produce nearly proportionate
decreases in the amount that individuals will spend to avoid even these less-
probable harms. Minor errors or alterations in estimation or calculation of
low-probability harms can have drastic consequences. Past a certain point,
low probabilities all tend to look the same to human eyes: they are all very
small. But when multiplied by a very high-magnitude threat, these small
differences become enormous. Where probabilities are small and uncertain,
miniscule errors become decisive miscalculations. Again, all the biases trend
systematically upwards: the government and the courts will tend to
absolutely unlimited." Id. But that protection lapses only in the face of concrete, highly
probable events: "No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction
to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops." Id. (emphasis added). Absent is any sense that a low-probability harm, even
one of enormous magnitude, would legitimize a prior restraint.
132. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 220-21; see also infta Part W.A.
133. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
121, 131 (2003); see also infra Part W.B.
134. See infta Part IV.B.
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exaggerate the threat of these harms, to constitutional effect. The result is a
willingness to accept outsized restrictions on speech that promise only to
mitigate harms that are less serious than the affected parties realize.
Third, and finally, individuals respond emotionally-and thus
disproportionately--to the threat of particularly dreadful or fearsome
harms. 35 Low-probability, high-magnitude speech harms frequently manifest
themselves in dreadful form: wars, riots, revolutions, and acts of terrorism.
Similarly, the "availability heuristic" predicts that decision-makers will
respond more emphatically to threats when examples of them come readily
to mind. 136 Many of the types of high-magnitude, low-probability harms that
speech might cause-terrorism, most notably-are particularly salient at
present, and individuals are consequently apt to overestimate systematically
the chance that they will occur. A concerned populace will tend to inflate a
salient threat of negligible probability into a peril of constitutional
magnitude.
In the absence of a probability threshold, courts will systematically
suppress more speech than they should, and constitutional liberties will
suffer at the hands of an overexcited populace and an overeager
governmental censor. Probability thresholds therefore act as a rough
corrective, weeding out those uncertain, extremely low-probability harms
that do not merit constitutional cognizance. What appears at first blush as a
misguided verbal formula is instead a prescient, if crude, attempt to guard
against cognitive tendencies that threaten to undermine the rational cost-
benefit analysis the First Amendment demands.
One final brief note is necessary. In the Sections that follow, I suggest a
normative justification for the probability threshold. I do not mean to
suggest that the Supreme Court necessarily adopted a series of doctrines
that effectuate this doctrine with these behavioral justifications in mind,
though there is some evidence to this effect. 137 Much work in legal history
remains to be done in order to determine whether the probability threshold
is a result of the Supreme Court's prescientific intuition regarding cognitive
biases, a happy accident, or something else entirely.
A. GOVERNMENTAL OVERESTIMATION
Free-speech cases-and particularly those cases in which speech may be
censored for being dangerous-place government in an odd role. On the
one hand, it is always the censor; an individual wishes to speak, and the
government wishes to curtail that speech for fear of the harm that it will do.
Yet, the government also offers the most important-and to some minds, the
135. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE
L.J. 61, 71 (2002); see also infta Part IV.C.
136. See Sunstein, supra note 135, at 64.
137. See infta Part IV.C.
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only reliable 38 -estimation of the harm that will result from speech. The
government must then act as both advocate and impartial analyst, urging the
court to adopt its calculation of speech harms and benefits as it
simultaneously holds sole possession of the information and interpretive
power necessary to make such a calculation. Predictably, these roles often
merge.
The result is governmental probability inflation; the government alleges
to the court that an event-most commonly a low-probability event-is more
likely to occur than is, in fact, the case. When it occurs in the context of a
low-probability threat, this effect is frequently decisive. An extremely high-
magnitude, extremely low-probability harm that might make for a
borderline constitutional case can become a compelling threat, justifying
extreme anti-speech measures, if the government exaggerates the
probability of its occurrence even slightly.139 And when the essential pieces
of information regarding the putative threat are in the government's
possession, the possibility of threat inflation is omnipresent.
In order to believe that the government will systematically
overexaggerate the threats posed by speech, it is not necessary to believe that
"executive action is more likely to be worse during emergencies," wars, or
other moments of national disorder than it is during any other times. 140 A
theory of governmental threat inflation is entirely consistent with the belief
that the government is no more or less likely to attempt to suppress
legitimately constitutionally protected speech during times of unrest than it
is at any other moment.14
Nor is it necessary to believe that the executive will seize upon war,
emergencies, or civil unrest to enact constitutionally suspect programs that
otherwise would not be politically feasible. Governmental inflation can
operate even if one does not believe that, for instance, "a security-minded
President might use [an] emergency to justify imposing restrictions the
President would have liked to have had in place before the emergency.', 42 A
theory of governmental-threat inflation does not rely upon the executive
138. See POSNER, supra note 56, at 316. Judge Posner argues that the President (and
presumably the executive-branch national-security apparatus as a whole) is the only actor
equipped to evaluate the threat posed by terrorists and civil unrest. Id.
139. See infra Part 1V.B.
140. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REv. 605,
609 (2003). Posner and Vermeule argue that there is no evidence to suggest that the executive
branch does any worse of ajob at gauging the correct programs to undertake, or of balancing
harms and benefits, during emergencies or wartime than at any other time. Id.
141. Id.
142. Mark Tushnet, Issues of Method in Analyzing the Policy Response to Emergencies, 56 STAN. L.
REv. 1581, 1589 (2004).
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possessing nefarious motives and a cynical willingness to employ an apparent
exigency in service of his goals.
143
Rather, in order to believe that the government is systematically likely to
inflate the probability that an unlikely harm will occur, it is necessary to
believe only that the executive, like any other litigant, wants to win its cases.
Imagine that the executive views a certain "package" of speech (spoken by a
variety of actors) as dangerous and believes honestly that for the good of the
polity it should suppress that speech.' 44 (Remember that this analysis does
not require one to ascribe bad motives to the government.) The speakers
challenge these restrictions in court. The executive believes that all of these
speech restrictions-some of which may, in fact, violate the Constitution,
some of which may not-are valid and necessary. Thus, the government
concludes that it should (both as a matter of its rational self-interest as a
public actor and in terms of the appropriate legal outcome) win all of these
cases in court. The government will not behave then as a diffident neutral
source; it will make its best case and place its best argumentative foot
forward. It will present the facts in the light most favorable to its own
position, having already decided that the restriction is appropriate. 145 The
government holds a systematic interest in obtaining a high rate of success
when it chooses to bring suit against a speaker in the first place.
The history of the United States' censorship of allegedly dangerous
speech is rife with examples of the executive's overestimation and inflation
of the threat posed by expression. Perilous Times, Professor Geoffrey Stone's
143. Though, this characterization seems entirely plausible. Tushnet, in a reply to Posner
and Vermeule's article on emergencies, supra note 140, posits this type of opportunistic
behavior as the causal mechanism behind anti-liberty governmental over-reaching during
wartime, Tushnet, supra note 142, at 1590, and his account has a ring of truth to it. Executive
actors have preferences of all types that they wish to satisfy, and if the opportunity to satisfy a
preference arrives only in the context of other, unrelated events, it is difficult to envision why
the executive actor would not avail himself of this opportunity. Posner and Vermeule do not
dispute Tushnet's characterization; they add only that the expanded realm of politically feasible
actions may include just as many new good governmental programs as bad ones. Eric A. Posner
& Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Political Change: A Reply to Tushnet, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1593,
1594-95 (2004).
144. It is costly for the executive to act to curtail speech-whether it is actually suing for an
injunction or padlocking a newspaper. Thus, pursuant to this model, it is necessary to assume
only that the executive will take action to block speech if, and only if, it genuinely believes that
the speech fails the cost-benefit test.
145. Not only will the government undoubtedly choose to make its own case (rather than
making the opposition's case in equally strong fashion), but after having already concluded that
the speech restriction is justified, it likely will have anchored itself to that conclusion and will
view the facts with that perspective in mind. See Andrew J. Wistrich, et al., Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1286-89
(2005). Countervailing facts that might have led an outside observer to doubt the executive's
conclusions will be glossed over; minor facts that do not lend significant support to those
conclusions may take on new life. This is the very nature of advocacy; once the course of action
has been decided, the advocate becomes convinced of the rectitude of the cause.
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comprehensive account of the First Amendment's treatment during
wartime, describes a multiplicity of instances in which the government
alleged (as plausible) speech-related threats that were, in fact, entirely highly
improbable, if not entirely impossible. 46 Among them: Federalists argued
for the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798, alleging that a "crowd of spies
• ,,147
and inflammatory agents" endangered the nation's "very existence ;
during the Civil War the military claimed that the Chicago Times dissenting
voice had done "incalculable injury" to the Union cause;148 executive actors
alleged during World War I that mild, local acts of dissent would seriously
disrupt the military's conscription and recruitment efforts; 149 at the height of
the "McCarthy era," local libraries rushed to "remove 'Communistic' books"
from their shelves and the House Committee on Un-American Activities
announced that "Hollywood was in the grip of a Red terror";150 and the
Senate Internal Security Committee alleged that the anti-Vietnam War
movement "was controlled by communist and extremist elements who are
openly sympathetic to the Vietcong and openly hostile to the United States,"
while President Johnson even believed that they were "part of an
international Communist conspiracy. ,151
The denouement of the Pentagon Papers case is representative.
15 2
Despite the government's dire predictions of the harm that would befall the
country should the papers be released, Erwin Griswold, who as Solicitor
General had argued the case and made such claims before the Supreme
Court, admitted fifteen years later that the government had engaged in
"'massive overclassification' . . . and that 'the principal concern of the
classifiers [was] not with national security, but rather with governmental
embarrassment of one sort or another.'"1
53
Not only are such executive exaggerations endemic to speech-related
harms, they may well be particular to speech-related harms-or at least to
threats from allegedly subversive domestic elements. In an effort to rebut the
notion that "the lesson of history is that officials habitually exaggerate
dangers to the nation's security,"' 154 one scholar assembled a list of official
146. See generally STONE, supra note 22; David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953
(2002) (noting that as a historical matter, the United States has frequently overreacted in times
of crisis).
147. STONE, supra note 22, at 37 (internal quotation maks and endnote omitted).
148. Id. at 107 (internal quotation marks and endnote omitted).
149. Id. at 171-73.
150. Id. at 334, 365 (internal quotation marks and endnote omitted).
151. Id. at 442 (internal quotation marks and endnote omitted).
152. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
153. STONE, supra note 22, at 512 n.* (quoting Erwin Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping,
WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25).
154. POSNER, supra note 56, at 298.
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underestimations of harm that included not a single speech-related threat
and only one event that even debatably implicated civil liberties:
[T] he danger of secession that led to the Civil War, ... the danger
of a Japanese attack on the United States that led to the disaster at
Pearl Harbor, . . . the danger of Soviet espionage in the 1940s that
accelerated the Soviet Union's acquisition of nuclear weapons and
by doing so emboldened Stalin to encourage North Korea to
invade South Korea in 1950 .... the installation in 1962 of Soviet
missiles in Cuba that precipitated the Cuban missile crisis .... the
outbreaks of urban violence and political assassinations in the
1960s .... the Tet Offensive of 1968 in the Vietnam War .... the
Iranian Revolution of 1979 and subsequent taking of American
diplomats hostage.... the catastrophe of September 11, 2001.155
What unites these examples most decisively is the fact that in not one
case was the government attempting to defend a restriction on liberty that it
had already deemed necessary, precisely the context in which speech cases must
always arise. Even if the government underestimated threats more frequently
than it overestimated them, it would still be the case that the government
was systematically more inclined to overestimate than underestimate a peril
when it sought to uphold a liberty-inhibiting policy in court.15 6 The proof is
by contrapositive: these examples and counterexamples demonstrate that
the executive only underestimates threats when there is no case to be won,
no extant speech-suppressing policy to defend. Once the government is
haled into court to defend itself, the trend is quite the opposite.
Deference to the executive has become a judicial shibboleth and, in
157most cases, appropriately so -the executive is peculiarly capable of
155. Id. at 298-99. In their review of Judge Posner's book, Michael Sullivan and Daniel
Solove point out that none of these examples involves a government attempt to curtail liberty
(much less suppress speech). Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism Be Radical?
Richard Posner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. 687, 710-13 (2003) (reviewing POSNER, supra
note 56). Indeed, it is unclear how a curb on liberty might have helped avert any of the events
Posner discusses.
156. This goes for situations unrelated to speech as well. There is ample indication that the
American military drastically inflated the threat of Japanese sabotage on the West Coast during
World War II (which led eventually to the internment of Japanese citizens and the Korematsu
decision, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)) because of racial animus rather than
any actual evidence. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in
Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 273, 288 (2003). Likewise, the government's reaction to the post-war
Red Scare was radically overinclusive and overwrought. See, e.g., id. at 289 ("[T]he Department
ofJustice actually had very little evidence to support its claims that the aliens it sought to deport
were dangerous radicals.").
157. See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military
Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 445 (2005) (describing court deference to military decisions
despite existing administrative-law principles). See generally, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Administrative
Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663 (2005) (describing an administrative-law framework for
evaluating executive action).
1328 [2007]
PROBABILITY THRESHOLDS
assessing and evaluating national-security threats. 158 But when courts afford
this deference, inflation of the threatened harm is one of the natural
consequences. As the subject matter moves further outside of the courts'
competence-in other words, as the probability of an event drops and it
becomes less susceptible to judicial evaluation-that effect increases, and
deference becomes an ever more decisive factor in the weighing of costs and
benefits.
59
Moreover, low-probability, high-magnitude harms are particularly
susceptible to governmental inflation. The lowest-probability harms involve
especially acute informational asymmetries between the government and the
court (and the opposing party). The less likely an event is to occur-and the
more dramatic the threat-the less likely it is that background information
relating to the event's potential causes or antecedents will have seeped into
the public domain. The explanation echoes in the nature of both low-
probability events and high-magnitude harms.
First, a potential harm of great magnitude 16 0 can assume only a few
forms (remember that this must also be a harm catalyzed by speech). A war.
A riot. A revolution. An act of terrorism or violence, necessarily with a
substantially destructive weapon. A significant combat loss, such as the
sinking of a troop transport. These categories define nearly the entire
universe of relevant high-magnitude speech harms. Such harms share one
essential, salient characteristic: they all concern topics that are especially-if
not exclusively-within the expertise of the executive branch. 161 Only the
158. See Korenatsu, 323 U.S. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("In the very nature of things,
military decisions are not susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal."); N. Jersey Media Group,
Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219 (3d Cir. 2002) ("We are quite hesitant to conduct ajudicial
inquiry into the credibility of these security concerns, as national security is an area where
courts have traditionally extended great deference to Executive expertise." (citing Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001))); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 707 (6th Cir.
2002) ("Inasmuch as these agents' declarations establish that certain information revealed
during removal proceedings could impede the ongoing anti-terrorism investigation, we defer to
their judgment. These agents are certainly in a better position to understand the contours of
the investigation and the intelligence capabilities of terrorist organizations."); cf United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("In this vast external realm [of foreign
affairs and international relations], with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation.").
159. Courts do not drop this deferential posture lightly. Cf Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
827 (1974) ("[I]n the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials
have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their
expert judgment in such matters. Courts cannot, of course, abdicate their constitutional
responsibility to delineate and protect fundamental liberties.").
160. And sufficiently low probability as to render its constitutional significance debatable.
161. The only possible exception is the possibility of a riot or other such domestic
disturbance, about which civilian social scientists might have as much to say as any executive-
branch policymaker. Still, the danger inherent to such a disturbance, which includes the issue
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executive can know if the publication of a ship's schedule will lead to the
sinking of a transport because only the executive knows when the transports
sail or how much submarine activity they are likely to encounter. 162 Only the
executive can know whether the publication of partial plans for the
hydrogen bomb will actually make it more likely that some terrorist or rogue
nation could acquire the bomb, since only the executive knows what other
information is yet to be published or how difficult it is to obtain plutonium
and tritium on the world market.163 And only the executive can know
whether opening the deportation hearing of a potential terrorist to the news
media will give other terrorists valuable information about American anti-
terrorism methods because only the executive knows what those methods
are or how they relate to what the hearing might divulge.' 64 High-magnitude
harms are national-security-implicating harms, and national-security-
implicating harms are the province of the executive.
Second, and in concomitant fashion, low-probability harms rarely
involve simple causal relationships-if A, then B, but only with small
probability. More frequently they require a series of only loosely dependent
probable occurrences, the interaction of disparate parties, or fortuitous
conjunctions of unrelated events. The greater the number of moving parts
and the more complex the relationships that a particular speech act must
catalyze in order for a harm to occur, the more difficult and costly it is for a
court to make an independent assessment of that harm's likelihood. The
link is with Brandenbur's "imminence" requirement: once a potential causal
chain has become so attenuated that an event will not necessarily occur
"imminently," that chain likely involves a sufficiently large number of links
that a court will have difficulty assessing the relevant probability absent some
strong indication from the government. 165 It is endemic to the structure of
American government that these types of decisions fall within the near-
. 66
exclusive competence of the executive. The question that remains is how
to cope with the systemic distortions that result.
of how many police or national guard units stand ready to quell it, is a topic about which the
executive is likely to have far better information than even any outside expert.
162. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (describing the
permissibility of government prevention of the publication of the sailing dates of troop
transports).
163. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 993 (W.D. Wis. 1979)
(considering a request for an injunction to prohibit the publication of plans for a
thermonuclear weapon).
164. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 217-20 (3d Cir. 2002)
(regarding the closing of a special-interest INS detainee hearing); Detroit Free Press v.
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 705-06 (6th Cir. 2002) (same).
165. Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
166. POSNER, supra note 56, at 316. Judge Posner writes:
But if lawyers are not equipped to formulate sound legal policy regarding
international terrorism, who is? The President is, virtually by default. The relevant
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Throughout history, when the executive has exaggerated threats to
justify speech restrictions, it typically has exaggerated low-probability threats,
transmogrifying them from negligible dangers into constitutionally
cognizable harms. 16 These are the types of dangers that will be more
particularly within the executive's competence than the courts', and these
are the types of dangers for which small adjustments in probability will
168produce the greatest impact."
B. LOW-PROBABILITY MA THE MA TICS AND
THE DIFFICULTY OF WEIGHING COSTS AND BENEFI'S
What the executive cannot do for itself, the courts and the populace will
do for it. The cognitive-science literature offers a fairly robust description of
the extraordinary difficulties that individuals have when coping with low-
probability threats or even when rationally evaluating low-probability
events.169 Individuals tend to drastically overrate the statistical value of low-
probability harms as a purely mathematical matter, substantially overpricing
those harms when compared with harms of more easily quantifiable
probabilities.
It is worth pausing now to note that by the use of the word "individuals"
here and in the following Sections, I do not mean only the great proverbially
unwashed masses, as distinct from the noble and rational judiciary. A
significant body of literature substantiates the belief that judges are highly
susceptible to the same sorts of cognitive errors and biases that plague non-judicil .. .. 170judicial decision-making. And while there is reason to believe that experts
may not succumb to all of the biases that interfere with a layperson's ability
expertise, on which he can draw, is widely distributed both within and outside
government, but often in a form that cannot easily be presented in a legal forum,
and not only because of the need for secrecy.
Id.
167. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
168. It is reasonable to assume that decision-makers-and the general public-will be risk
averse to some degree and will rationally favor restrictions on low-probability harms that do not
quite pass the cost-benefit test. But this fact does not change this Section's analysis. Risk
averseness will only shift the cost-benefit curve slightly downwards; it will not change the shape
of that curve or eliminate the long tail. A subset of low-probability harms that fail even risk-
averse cost-benefit balancing and are susceptible to the cognitive errors described here will
remain.
169. For background on the application of cognitive science to legal decision-making, see
generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471
(1998) (describing "how law and economic analysis may be improved by increased attention to
insights about actual human behavior").
170. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 816-18 (2001)
(discussing studies that show that judges perform only slightly better than laypeople at avoiding
typical cognitive errors); Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 165, 185-93 (2006); Paul Slovic et al., Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk,
in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 137, 152 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000); Wistrich et al., supra note 145.
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to make rational choices,' 7' judges are not experts (at assessing national
172
security threats, for instance)-they are intelligent, educated generalists.
That fact is, of course, part of what makes deference to administrative
agencies and executive actors appropriate in the first instance. 7 Absent any
strong indication that judges will succeed in dodging the cognitive pitfalls
that speckle typical rationality, this Article treats judicial and nonjudicial
actors alike.' 74
1. Low-Probability Value Inflation
Study after study has demonstrated that individuals experience great
difficulty, purely as a matter of estimation and intuition, when dealing with
high-magnitude, low-probability threats. For many years, economists,
lawyers, regulators, and other types of decision-makers routinely have used
statistical measures of the value of a human life when performing cost-
benefit analyses and making regulatory decisions. Analysts obtain these
value-of-life numbers by looking at the salary premiums that workersS 175
demand for more dangerous jobs, the amounts that people will pay to
avoid certain every-day risks, 176 or by simply performing surveys that ask
hypothetical questions regarding what an individual would be willing to pay
to avoid a peril of some fixed probability. While these estimates are hardly
exact, they are well accepted and widely used within the risk-management
industry and usually conform to a reasonably limited range of values. The
value of life is most commonly priced at around $7 million.'7 7 Importantly,
though, these calculations are made almost always with reference to fairly
171. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 494-508 (2002). But seeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, The Uncertain
Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1165, 1216 n.270 (2005) (listing studies that
demonstrate that experts make many of the same cognitive errors as laypeople).
172. In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 205 (2d Cir. 2001) ("As generalists, [judges] need to
continue to acquire general information .... We cannot make intelligent fact decisions or
evaluate the effect of our legal decisions on society unless we have some understanding of that
society." (internal citations omitted)); Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis, 53 DUKE L.J. 1067, 1092 (2003) ("Judicial deference to agency action is justified by
division of labor: agencies are specialists, judges are generalists.").
173. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219 (3d Cir. 2002)
("[N]ational security is an area where courts have traditionally extended great deference to
Executive expertise.").
174. These conclusions are naturally tentative and subject to revision as the social-science
literature advances.
175. Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 46, at 18-23 (reviewing the literature and performing a
meta-analysis of studies of wage-risk tradeoffs in the United States labor market).
176. See id. at 24-26 (reviewing past studies of price-risk tradeoffs in the United States
housing and product markets).
177. See id. at 18-26, 63. Viscusi and Aldy's meta-study obtained a median value of life of
$6.7 million with a standard deviation of $5.6 million, and half of the studies from the United
States labor market arrived at values between $5 million and $12 million. Id. at 18, 63.
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commonplace risks (workplace accidents and the like) that occur with
significant probability.
17 8
Yet when the probability that a harm will occur drops significantly,
toward a chance of one in hundreds of thousands or one in a million,
individuals' responses to the same types of risk-assessment questions change
drastically. The average person is willing to pay far more to avoid an
exceedingly low-probability harm than the standard $7 million value of life
would predict. In one survey, respondents confronted with a probabilistic
threat to their lives of 1 in 100,000 were willing to pay approximately $220 to
avoid the danger, which corresponds to a value of life of $22 million-
already well above the typical $7 million benchmark.1 79 But when a parallel
set of respondents were asked about a threat to their lives of only 1 in a
million probability, they were still willing to pay on average $100 to avoid it,
placing their estimated value of life at $100 million-nearly fifteen times the
usual number and five times the value for a threat of tenfold greater
probability.'
8 0
Another study displayed this effect in even starker relief. Respondents
were willing to pay, on average, $15 per airplane flight to lower the risk of a
terrorist attack on that flight from 1 in a million to 1 in 10 million. 8 ' This
price, for a risk reduction of 9 in 10 million, corresponds to a value of life of
approximately $16 million, already well above the typical amount. But this
effect exploded when respondents were asked what they would pay to
eliminate that final 1 in 10 million chance. The average person was willing to
spend more than $16 in the face of only a 1 in 10 million probability of
harm, pricing her life at a whopping $160 million. 18 2 Other studies have
revealed a similar effect, with individuals even willing to pay more to avoid
smaller risks than to avoid larger ones. l s'
The consequences of this type of value inflation are straightforward and
severe. Ajudge or juror performing cost-benefit analysis on a speech act that
178. See id. at 19-21, 25. The studies surveyed involved such events as typical workplace
injuries, fatal automobile accidents, air pollution, cigarette smoking, and bicycle accidents. Id.
Most risks fell in the vicinity of 1 in 10,000. Id. Viscusi and Aldy's meta-analysis also revealed an
inverse correlation between the value of a statistical life and the risk of death. Id. at 23.
179. Sunstein, supra note 133, at 131. This is despite the optimism that individuals typically
display toward their own chances of danger. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of
Redistributive Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1658-63 (1998).
180. Id. By contrast, individuals typically underestimate larger-probability risks on the order
of 1 in 1,000. W. Kip ViscusI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK
150 (1992).
181. Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 24, at 116.
182. Id.
183. V. Kerry Smith & William H. Desvousges, An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Value of
Risk Changes, 95 J. POL. ECON. 89, 100 tbl.2 (1987). Respondents to this study exhibited a
willingness to pay more to reduce a small risk by 90% than to reduce a larger risk by the same
proportion-meaning that they were paying extra for a smaller reduction in absolute risk-
even when the two choices were presented sequentially to the same study participants. Id.
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threatens a harm of high magnitude and low probability will be inclined to
substantially overvalue the "cost" side of the ledger, compared to a higher-
probability harm of similar statistical value, simply because of the low
probability itself. This willingness to overpay to avoid low-probability threats
will result in systematic oversuppression of speech in the presence of low-
probability, high-magnitude harms; too little speech will occur when
compared to either the result of an unadulterated cost-benefit analysis or to
a balancing of speech against only higher-probability harms. By screening
out the very lowest-probability events and their drastic distortions of cost-
benefit analysis (again, valuations of life increase fivefold as the probability
of harm drops from 1/100,000 to 1/1,000,000), a probability threshold will
act as a crude check on this anti-speech bias.
2. Low-Probability Risk Insensitivity
The studies described above reveal two coordinated effects. First, as
threats grew smaller, the actuarial value of life increased rapidly.114 In the
presence of small probabilities, individuals functioned as poor cost-benefit
balancers. But what should not be overlooked is the fact that these inflated
cost-of-life values resulted from peoples' willingness to pay approximately
equivalent amounts of money to eliminate all "small" risks, even when they
actually differed in probability by an order of magnitude. Low-probability
value inflation is thus part and parcel of what one might describe as low-
probability insensitivity-layperson inability to distinguish between various
tiny probabilities, even when they differ by as much as a factor of ten.
l 5
Another experiment highlights this effect and is worth describing in
some detail. A 1998 survey told respondents a fictional story about a
chemical plant that was at risk of releasing dangerous chemicals into the
atmosphere above a nearby community.186 The survey described an
insurance company engaged in writing policies for affected community
members and then provided an estimate of the probability of a chemical
release (some surveys listed it at 1 in 100,000, some at 1 in 1 million, and
some at 1 in 10 million).187 Each survey provided only one of the three
values.
The surveys then offered comparison data regarding the probability of a
car accident and asked four questions:
184. See supra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
185. SeeViscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 24, at 116.
186. Howard Kunreuther et al., Making Low Probabilities Useful, 23 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
103, 106 (2001).
187. Id. Some surveys phrased the information in terms of insurance premiums, offering
the surveytaker an estimate of the premium that the insurance company would charge to insure
against the harm (between fifteen cents and fifteen dollars). Since the survey obtained
essentially identical results regardless of whether it was posed in terms of premiums or
probabilities, I have described only the probability context here.
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(1) whether the plant posed a serious health and safety risk to
those living in the community, (2) whether the plant could operate
in a manner that was safe for the community, (3) how serious is the
risk of death posed by the plant, and (4) how close to the plant
respondents would be willing to live.""
Remarkably, respondents proved almost completely insensitive to the ten-
fold gradations in risk between each of the three scenarios. In their
responses to the four questions, they graded the threat of a chemical release
as "medium" (corresponding approximately to a risk of "3" on a scale of 1 to
5) irrespective of which of the three probabilities appeared on the survey
they were given. 89 The survey respondents apparently viewed small risks as
exactly that-and only that; the statistically enormous differences between
them did not even register. As one commentator suggests, it is likely that for
risks in these domains "the relevant probability is 'low, but not zero,' and...
finer distinctions are unhelpful."1 90
A number of other studies have documented the same effect even
among individuals presented with two differing risk situations side-by-side1
91
In contexts ranging from automobile fatalities,' 92 to serious automobile• • • 193 194 9
injuries, to hazardous waste, to pesticides used on fresh produce, 9 5 and• 196
even to oyster-borne illnesses, survey respondents displayed an utter
inability to modulate their willingness to pay for increases in safety according
to how much those safety increases actually would diminish the probability
of harm. In one study, nearly half of survey respondents were willing to pay
188. Id. at 107.
189. Id. The survey asked respondents to answer each of the four questions on a scale of I
to 5, with 1 the "lowest risk" answer and 5 the "highest risk" answer. Respondents who were told
that the chances of an accident were 1 in 100,000 rated the risk at 3.03; those who were told
that the probability was 1 in 1 million rated the risk at 2.93; and those who were given a risk
assessment of 1 in 10 million rated the risk at 3.01. The differences were not statistically
significant.
190. Sunstein, supra note 135, at 71. Indeed, studies have shown a correlation between the
probability of a harm and the likelihood that an individual will underestimate the threat posed
by that harm. See BARUCH FISCHHOFF ET AL., ACCEPTABLE RISK 29 (1981).
191. This is known as a "within subjects" design. The fact that survey respondents were
unable to draw meaningful distinctions between different risk cases, even when they were
presented simultaneously, renders these results all the more robust-not to mention irrational
and counterintuitive.
192. M.W. Jones-Lee et al., The Value of Safety: Results of a National Sample Survey, 95 ECON. J.
49, 65-66 (1985).
193. M.W. Jones-Lee et al., Valuing the Prevention of Non-Fatal Road Injuries: Contingent
Valuation vs. Standard Gambles, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 676, 688 (1995).
194. Smith & Desvousges, supra note 183, at 99-100.
195. Young Sook Eom, Pesticide Residue Risk and Food Safety Valuation: A Random Utility
Approach, 76 AM.J. AGRIC. ECON. 760, 769 (1994).
196. C.-T. Jordan Lin & J. Walter Milon, Contingent Valuation of Health Risk Reductions for
Shellfish Products, in VALUING FOOD SAFETY AND NUTRITION 83-114 (J.A. Caswell ed., 1995).
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more for a reduction in the probability of death from an unspecified cause
from 2 in 100,000 to 1 in 100,000 than they were for a reduction in the
probability of death from a similarly unspecified cause from 20 in 100,000 to
15 in 100,000-despite the fact that the second reduction is fivefold
greater. 97 It seems that individuals simply experience great difficulty at
evaluating low probabilities with any consistency or accuracy.'9s
Like its partner value inflation, probability insensitivity will tend to bias
cost-benefit results systematically in favor of curtailing speech to protect
against prospective harms. As probabilities of harm decrease, individuals pay
less and less attention to fine gradations, pushing results towards the high-
probability end of the spectrum. Failure to recognize or appreciate the true
size of a small probability represents the type of cognitive error that tends to
compel decision-makers to accept restrictions on otherwise beneficial
activities that they would not permit under an accurate cost-benefit analysis.
3. The Tyranny of Small Mistakes
Compounding the errors introduced into low-probability cost-benefit
analysis by the cognitive biases described above is the fact that when it comes
to low-probability events-indeed, when it comes to small numbers
generally-small mistakes can produce enormous consequences.
Estimations of large-magnitude damages are relatively robust. Underwriters,
actuaries, and other risk assessors have become adept at gauging the damage
that a putative danger might cause within reasonable limits. Working values
for the cost of human life, major injuries, or damage to particular types of
property exist, and risk experts employ them widely.' 99 But more to the
point, small mistakes are dwarfed by the enormous monetary baselines
employed in such risk assessments. A very conservative estimate might place
the value of the damage from the September llth attacks on the World
Trade Center at approximately $25 billion. 20 0 Even if that figure is off-target
by a substantial amount, such as $2 billion, the overall effect on any resulting
computation will be less than 10%.
Probability assessments, on the other hand, introduce far greater
uncertainty into any calculation. As this Article describes, speech harms
197. M. W.Jones-Lee et al., supra note 192, at 65-66.
198. See Sunstein, supra note 135, at 73-74 ("For most of us, most of the time, the relevant
differences-between, say, 1/100,000 and 1/1,000,000-are not pertinent to our decisions, and
by experience we are not well equipped to take those differences into account.").
199. See generally Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 46. These estimations have become particularly
common within the United States government, where executive orders and regulations from
the Office of Management and Budget mandate cost-benefit pricing of most proposed
regulations and analysts employ risk-risk analysis (a weighing of the risks involved in
promulgating the regulation against the risks involved in not promulgating the regulation) in
the remainder. See id. at 5-6, 53-54.
200. This calculation was based on approximately 2,700 deaths at a cost of $6.7 million per
death and an order of magnitude estimate of property damage at $10 billion.
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depend upon the actions of one or more intervening parties, as well as any
number of other compounding or confounding factors. The probabilities
involved in these events-which themselves invoke questions regarding, for
example, the motivations or capabilities of some terrorist or military
organization-hardly conduce to easy rational estimation.' °  There is a
reason why these cases are discussed so frequently in qualitative terms and so
rarely with reference to quantified probabilities."'
Moreover, small errors in low-probability estimations introduce
enormous variation into cost-benefit calculations. The mathematical point is
both mundane and crucial: if the government believes that an event will
occur with a probability of 2 in 100,000 if certain speech is allowed to take
place, but the actual probability is, in fact, 1 in 100,000,203 then the statistical
estimate of harm is off by 50%. When the uncertainties endemic to assessing
speech-related harms are coupled with standard probability indifference,
errors of this magnitude seem almost inevitable.
It is important to note that low-probability errors of this type are not
themselves systematically biased toward either overestimation or
underestimation of statistical harm. The mathematics of small probabilities
work only as a lens, magnifying the effect of whatever errors have already
taken place. Yet, as the rest of this Section describes, those errors are likely
to be mistakes of over-estimation: miscalculations tending to inflate and
overemphasize the dangers attendant to speech. Enhanced by the
mathematics of small numbers, these upward biases will magnify ephemeral
threats into constitutionally significant events.
201. See Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949).Judge Hand wrote:
The injuries are always a variable within limits, which do not admit of even
approximate ascertainment; and, although probability might theoretically be
estimated, if any statistics were available, they never are; and, besides, probability
varies with the severity of the injuries. It follows that all such attempts are illusory;
and, if serviceable at all, are so only to center attention upon which one of the
factors may be determinative in any given situation.
Id.
202. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 923 (D.C. Cir.
2003) ("[T]he declarations state that release of the requested information could hamper the
ongoing investigation by leading to the identification of detainees by terrorist groups, resulting
in terrorists either intimidating or cutting off communication with the detainees .... "
(emphasis added)); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 993-94 (W.D. Wis.
1979) ("[T]he article could possibly provide sufficient information to allow a medium size nation
to move faster in developing a hydrogen weapon. It could provide a ticket to by-pass blind alleys.
The Morland piece could accelerate the membership of a candidate nation in the
thermonuclear club." (emphasis added)).
203. Here, I bracket all epistemological questions related to the "actual" probability of
some event that depends on any number of path-independent factors. For purposes of this
analysis, I simply assume that any given future event has some fixed probability of occurring
given the presence or absence of antecedent events, including the speech act in question.
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C. DREADFUL HARMS, EMOTIONAL RESPONSES, AND THE A VAILABILITY HEURISTIC
In addition to the purely mathematical errors that attend efforts to cope
with small numbers and low probabilities, the types of low-probability, high-
magnitude harms involved in free-speech cases often invoke strong
emotional responses that further skew attempts to perform rational cost-
benefit analysis. Two complementary cognitive effects are manifest. First,
individuals tend to overreact to harms from "dreadful" or "unknown"
sources or other types of harms that invoke a particularly significant
emotional response. High-magnitude harms resultant from speech are
almost always of this type; terrorism, riots, and the like are not the stuff of
ordinary experience, and their effects upon the public mood is far greater
than the number of casualties would indicate.
Second, individuals tend to overvalue harms that have special temporal
salience, harms that resonate with recent experience, or threats that seem
similar to ones they have heard about in the near past. The effect of this type
of cognitive bias-the "availability heuristic"-is obviously context-specific;
modern citizens are not likely to inflate the threat of a troop transport being
sunk in the same fashion as Americans living during the Second World War
might have. Yet, at least one class of potential high-magnitude speech harms,
terrorism, remains of obvious salience today. Moreover, the low-probability
threats that present themselves in any era-those threats that galvanize the
government into attempts to curb speech-are likely to have great
contemporaneous relevance, if for no other reason than for the fact that the
government will attempt to make the citizenry aware of them as a part of its
campaign to justify its restrictions on speech. High-magnitude, low-
probability speech harms are thus, by their very nature, likely to tap into
these heuristic biases. The result is a systematic overemphasis of low-
probability threats, an effect that the First Amendment's probability
threshold is meant crudely to counteract.
1. Emotions, Fear, and First Amendment Events
It is not surprising to learn that individuals respond more vociferously
to emotionally charged threats or events. Emotion is, by definition,
something that individuals experience outside of their purely rational modes
204of cognition-but that nevertheless influences individual preferences -
and a phenomenon that taps into both rational and extrarational centers
will undoubtedly produce some type of heightened effect. What is striking is
the degree to which emotional appeals can penetrate what ought to be
purely rational decision-making processes and the extent to which they can
skew the outcomes of those endeavors.
204. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1979-84 (2001)
(collecting and describing psychological studies demonstrating the influence of emotions on
decision-making and preference formation).
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Experiments have demonstrated that individuals are willing to pay
substantial premiums to avoid emotionally laden dangers above and beyond
what they would spend to eliminate banal risks of the same magnitude and
probability. In one study, subjects were willing to pay as much as 45% more
to avoid a risk that had been described to them in emotional terms than they
were willing to pay to avoid the same risk-a risk of death with the same
probability-when they had been offered the risk in emotion-neutral
terms. 05 Another study obtained similar results by looking at responses to
206 207threats of electric shock. °  These examples, alongside many others, reveal
a more particular trend: individuals will respond more strongly to "dreadful"
or "catastrophic" dangers and to dangers that they cannot control than they
will to typical, everyday harms. 2°' The effect can become extremely
pronounced in the context of improbable threats, as individuals "focus[]
their attention on the outcome rather than the low probability of the
harm."2 9 It is the "catastrophic potential" of a threat-not its low probability
or the statistical risk it actually poses-that dominates individual
assessments.'
The most immediate application of this notion is to terrorism, and
indeed, many commentators have concluded that mere invocation of the
threat of terrorism "evokes vivid images of disaster, thus crowding out
[rational] probability judgments" and enhancing the amount that
individuals would sacrifice to avoid such a harm.21 But the principle extends
to many of the types of low-probability, high-magnitude harms that might be
expected to arise from speech. To some degree, the effect reaches all low-
probability, high-impact harms; a "catastrophic" harm is simply one that is
large, and individuals will naturally respond most strongly to large, fearsome
threats of all types. But the harms associated with reckless speech are
particularly susceptible to these types of emotional over-reactions, partly
because they necessarily involve the machinations of faceless third parties
who act upon the speech. Wars, riots, terrorism, military disasters, and the
205. See Sunstein, supra note 133, at 125. Sunstein's subjects were willing to pay, on average,
$188.33 to avoid the emotionally charged risk and only $129.61 to dodge the unemotional
version. Id.
206. Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the
Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. Sci. 185, 185-90 (2001).
207. See, e.g., Slovic et al., supra note 170, at 143, 148 (describing the influence that the
dread, severity, and "catastrophic potential" of a harm have upon conceptions of that harm's
likelihood).
208. CHARLES PERROw, NORMAL AccIDENTs 324-28 (1999); see also Clark R. Chapman &
David Morrison, Impacts on the Earth by Asteroids and Comets: Assessing the Hazard, 367 NATURE 38
(1994); Slovic et al., supra note 170, at 143; Sunstein, supra note 133, at 121.
209. Sunstein, supra note 135, at 100.
210. Slovic et al., supra note 170, at 148.
211. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 45 (2002); Sunstein, supra note 133, at 128;
Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 24, at 99.
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chaos of the mob-these speech-induced threats conjure up dreadful images
and inspire fear in a way that even mass disasters such as earthquakes and
floods apparently do not.212 Fear is a powerful inducement to action,2 1 3 and
speech-borne threats catalyze reactions far beyond what quotidian risks such
as car accidents might produce,214 whether or not they offer a comparably
smaller statistical threat.
215
One intuitive consequence of this response is that individuals will tend
to focus systematically upon the "worst case," since it is that case that will
216trigger the strongest emotional response. In one experiment, subjects
received information about a potential risk from two parties: industry and
the government. 217 For some subjects, the government described the risk as
high and industry described it as low; for some subjects it was the opposite.
Yet, in all cases, respondents viewed "the high risk information as being
more informative," regardless of the source. 21 Experiments such as this one
would make it seem that our skewed perspective on the probability of
dreadful events might be triggered, in part, by our pessimistic willingness to
believe that they may well occur-whether or not that willingness is
attributable entirely to the vivid emotional picture that such harms paint. 219
The likely consequence is a decision-making populace prepared to believe
the worst whenever they are provided with competing characterizations of a
level of risk. In speech cases, the worst-case scenario will of course be the
one suggested by the censor. Therefore, it may be that even if the
government did not hold an information monopoly over assessments of
speech harms -and even if the government's opinion were not entitled to
212. See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Sci. 280, 281-83 (1987); cf. John Rather, Dreading
a Replay of the 1938 Hurricane, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, at LlI (citing a study that found that
before Hurricane Katrina, sixty-four percent of homes in the United States were underinsured
against floods and hurricanes).
213. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 140, at 626-34.
214. Data strongly suggest that individuals tend to underestimate the risk they face from
everyday dangers such as strokes (approximately 1 in 2,000) and automobile accidents (1 in
5,000). Viscusi, supra note 180, at 150.
215. These effects are undoubtedly exacerbated by the more general phenomenon that, as
one commentator put it, "the costs of freedom of expression are often more salient than the
benefits." Posner, supra note 22, at 744. Posner attributes this imbalance to the fact that speech
that challenges common assumptions can be painful in the immediate term but is "an
unavoidable concomitant of social progress," and so "the cost of heterodox speech is immediate
and its benefit deferred." Id.
216. Sunstein, supra note 135, at 82.
217. W. Kip Viscusi, Alarmist Decisions with Divergent Risk Information, 107 ECON. J. 1657,
1657-59 (1997).
218. Id. at 1666; see also Sunstein, supra note 135, at 82-83.
219. Sunstein, supra note 135, at 120-21. Sunstein views this phenomenon as yet another
manifestation of low-probability insensitivity. Id.
220. See supra Part W.A.
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special deference2-the mere fact that the government was forecasting the
most severe outcome would tilt the scales against other predictions.
2. The Availability Heuristic
Operating alongside the overemphasis on "dreadful" or terrible harms
is the tendency of individuals to overestimate the likelihood that an event
will occur when an example of that event comes readily to mind.222 This
effect, known as the "availability heuristic," is the product of the very human
tendency to focus on whatever evidence is most cognitively salient at any
given moment. 223 It is by definition context-specific; what is news today-and
therefore foremost in the minds of most individuals-may well not be news
tomorrow. Thus, the availability heuristic may favor certain impressions on
one day and a completely different set mere weeks or months later. Nor
does the availability heuristic necessarily systematically favor the government
or the speaker. A widely publicized story of police abuse-the unwarranted
beating of a suspect, for instance-can trigger the availability heuristic and
cause the public to misjudge the extent to which law-enforcement
authorities are overstepping their lawful boundaries. One week later, news
of the urban riot that erupted as a consequence of this act of police brutality
could induce the same public to believe that the citizenry has run amok and
that the authorities are doing an inadequate job of policing the
community.214 The only factor is how easily a decision-maker can summon
an instance of the event in question to mind.
It is worth noting also that the evidence and theory behind the
availability heuristic would seem to conflict to some degree with the
observation-offered by the same commentators who have recorded the
enhanced public reaction to particularly dreadful or frightful events-that
individuals respond more strongly to "unknown" dangers.125 Yet the
disagreement is not, in fact, so stark. The answer is revealed through the
types of risks that these commentators classify as "unknown": nuclear
226accidents, genetic mutations, food irradiation, and the like. The claim,
then, is not the facially bizarre assertion that individuals are responding to
risks that they do not know of; instead, they react most strongly to threats
221. See supra Part W.A.
222. Sunstein, supra note 133, at 121; see also STONE, supra note 22, at 537-38.
223. SUNSTEIN, supra note 211, at 34; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A
Heuristic forJudging Frequency and Probability, inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 163, 163-78 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some
Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 755 (1990).
224. Cf Posner & Vermeule, supra note 140, at 622-25 (arguing that publicly salient
examples of governmental over-reaction can catalyze expansions in civil liberties).
225. See PERROW, supra note 208, at 325-27.
226. See id.; Slovic et al., supra note 170, at 142. These risks are in contradistinction to such
daily terrors as car accidents or workplace injuries.
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that have been much discussed within the press but that are sufficiently
complex or "scientific" that the average layperson cannot comprehend
them. The availability heuristic would predict similar outcomes.
The impact of this tendency on how the American public perceives the
types of low-probability harms that speech might engender is far from one-
sided. Certain types of these threats would appear foreign or anachronistic
to modern eyes. Recent American history is hardly full of examples of
227speech acts inciting urban riots or pogroms, and the United States has not
had a troop transport sunk due to the publication of its sailing date in quite
some time. The availability heuristic might, in many cases, lead decision-
makers to underestimate the probability that those types of harms will
materialize; these are among the types of catastrophic events that are hard to
imagine taking place in the modern United States. In fact, the period of
McCarthyism during the 1940s and 1950s, an era characterized by what are
now viewed as excessive assaults on the freedom of speech, 22 arguably
retains greater salience than nearly any other series of events with such an
obvious speech valence. The availability heuristic thus might augur generally
greater protection for speech than conventional cost-benefit models would
prescribe.
There is, however, at least one more powerful counter-consideration:
the importance of terrorism. As of 2005, the terrorist threat remains perhaps
the single most salient issue of public policy, and the events of September
11 th maintain a position of prominence in the minds of people across the
country.2 29 The availability heuristic thus would predict that decision-makers
will systematically and severely inflate their estimates of the probability of a
terrorist event as one or more memorable examples come immediately to
mind. Not coincidentally, the vast majority of cost-benefit speech cases that
have come before the courts in recent years-and the vast majority that are
230expected to arrive in courtrooms in the near future-are terrorism cases.
227. See generally, eg., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (concerning
the unrealized threat of race riot); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam)
(concerning the unrealized threat of urban riot).
228. See STONE, supra note 22, at 311-426.
229. SUNSTEIN, supra note 211, at 50-52. By way of illustration, a Lexis search of the Wall
Street Journal for the words "terrorism" or "terrorist" produced 135 hits within the month of
March 2006 alone. A similar search of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution produced 102 hits. The
terrorist threat obviously retains preeminent salience within the public consciousness.
230. See generally, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002); Detroit Free
Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). Even the D.C. Circuit's recent decision denying
the existence of a constitutional reporter-source privilege rooted in the First Amendment
sounded in terrorism. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 965-67 (D.C. Cir.
2005). Whether a reporter-source privilege should exist is very much a question of the costs and
benefits involved in providing reporters with a shield against forced disclosure of information.
McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531 (7th Cir. 2003). The Judith Miller case appears against a
national-security backdrop; reporters were attempting to use the privilege in that case to block
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The availability heuristic may not be applicable ubiquitously, but it is likely
to have a substantial impact in the most crucial of contexts.
D. QUANIFYING THE PROBABILITY THRESHOID
As the prior Sections describe, speech-induced harms and benefits
remain notoriously difficult to quantify or to rate with any real accuracy. But
the foregoing analysis of the systematic biases that underlie and justify the
First Amendment's probability threshold reveals one salient, mathematical
characteristic of this constitutional construct: it must operate at the level of
orders of magnitude, not smaller probability comparatives.
The probability threshold cannot exist to separate events of probability
1 in 100,000 from events of probability 1 in 200,000, for instance; the coarse
approximations involved in First Amendment adjudications cannot cope
with such fine distinctions. Rather, wherever the probability threshold is
drawn, it must be drawn so as to separate (as constitutionally significant or
insignificant) events that differ in likelihood by one or more orders of
magnitude: a probability of 1 in 100,000 versus a probability of 1 in 10,000,
for instance. This mathematical description comports with our
understanding of how humans gauge small probabilities; extraordinarily
unlikely events do not succumb to more precise delineation. It thus may be
more appropriate to conceptualize the probability threshold on a
logarithmic scale, instead of a linear one. In graphical form, Figure 2 from
Part I becomes:
the investigation of the leaking of a CIA operative's name in conjunction with a public debate
over the threat of terrorism that existed before the war in Iraq. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397
F.3d at 965-68.
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Figure 3: The Probability Threshold Described Logarithmically
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The above graph is not meant to identify the exact probability range at
which the threshold operates but, instead, only to describe the type of
limitation it imposes. Courts need not strive to quantify the uncountable to
levels of precision beyond what the qualitative descriptions of the issues
before them will yield. Distinctions between events of, for instance, "small"
and "extremely small" probability, representing nothing more than order-of-
magnitude speculations, will be sufficient. The probability threshold thus
transforms what would be intricate, error-sensitive cost-benefit balancing
into the sort of rough approximations that conduce far more readily to
qualitative estimation. Threat inflation by the executive branch, cognitive
difficulties with small numbers, and systematic biases toward fearing
dreadful and salient harms are countered by the probability threshold's
rough-and-ready screening mechanism.
V. THE DANGERS OF UNCHECKED BALANCING:
THE PROBABILITY THRESHOLD AS SECOND-BEST CORRECTIVE
This Article describes the First Amendment probability threshold as a
"crude" corrective to the systematic errors that pervade cost-benefit analysis
of low-probability events. It is crude first because it is both over- and
underinclusive. There may well be highly improbable harms that threaten
such catastrophe that they should nonetheless trump the competing speech
concerns but will fail to pass the probability threshold. And there may be
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costs to speech that barely cross the threshold and-due to other cognitive
errors-erroneously pass straightforward cost-benefit analysis as well. 1 To
some extent, these concerns are the natural epistemic product of
rhetorically evaluating difficult-to-quantify costs and benefits, but, to some
extent, they represent true flaws in the solution.
Second, the probability threshold is crude in that it is second-best: it
would be preferable simply to eliminate the cognitive biases and structural
flaws that contribute to these errors in the first instance. The behavioral-
economics literature suggests that judges might be able to "de-bias" their
analyses in the same fashion that ordinary people might accomplish the
same feat: by gathering relevant experience in the field in which they work,
becoming aware of their own cognitive tendencies, and taking steps to avoid
232perpetuating their systematic errors. (On the other hand, there is
evidence to suggest that simply making judges aware of their own biases,
absent any type of particularized training, will not serve as an effective
cure.) 233 But these are individual and personal correctives, not doctrinal or
institutional ones. From the perspective of the Supreme Court, which is
charged with developing doctrine without the capacity to ascertain the
individual efforts of the lower-court judges, the probability threshold would
appear to be a more reliable systemic solution. It is difficult to imagine the
Supreme Court admonishing the lower courts to be careful not to allow
their emotions to carry them away, providing pellucid advice on how to cope
with their (and everyone's) tendency to inflate the anticipated effect of low-
probability events, or forcing lower-court judges to attend weekend-long
seminars on cognitive science.
Moreover, even effective de-biasing will not alter the governmental
structures that place the executive in the dual roles of interested litigant and
neutral information source and that lead irreducibly to low-probability
threat inflation. Forced decoupling of these two functions is likely
impossible. Nor can the judiciary simply decide to "doubt" (to some degree)
the facts and estimations of harm that the executive places before it. Such a
posture would run against centuries of intuitively sensible deference when
234
matters of national security are involved. This is not even to mention the
231. The probability threshold is of course not meant as a full substitute for cost-benefit
balancing, as it is certainly not the case that any likely harm-no matter how small in
magnitude-provides an adequate justification for banning speech. Rather, an asserted threat
suffices as a legitimate ground for suppressing speech only if it passes both the cost-benefit test
and the probability threshold.
232. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., supra note 170, at 822-26; cf Aaron J. Wright, Rendered
Impractical: Behavioral Economics and the Impracticability Doctrine, 26 CARDoZO L. REV. 2183, 2212-
13 (2005).
233. See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1316-18 (2006).
234. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) ("[W]e cannot reject as
unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress."); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
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fact that the judiciary has no other reliable source of information. The only
real alternative is the proverbial "thumb on the scale" on the side of speech,
and it is that effect that the probability threshold attempts, somewhat
clumsily, to replicate.
Yet, the difficulty in encapsulating this notion doctrinally should not be
interpreted as an indication that a probability threshold is superfluous. As
explained below, on several notable occasions, the courts have deviated from
the doctrinal teachings of Brandenburg, Chaplinsky, and the law of prior
restraints and upheld speech restrictions in light of potential harms that
would not surpass the probability threshold. In so doing, they allowed their
dread of dire consequences to trump logical analysis of the probabilistic
threat at hand. As a matter of cost-benefit analysis, it is possible that these
cases still were correctly decided, but they cannot be defended on the
grounds advanced by the courts. Without a probability threshold to bind
their decision-making, the courts have performed very poorly in the
presence of low-probability threats.
A. UNITED STATES V. PROGRESSIVE
235
United States v. Progressive is an unusual, almost unique, case. In 1978,
an anti-war activist named Howard Morland authored an article for The
Progressive magazine, describing plans for construction of a fusion bomb
(also known as a hydrogen bomb, or "H-bomb") based purely on publicly
available sources in order to display precisely how fragile and "open" the
236nation's nuclear secrets were. Fearing prosecution, the magazine sent a
draft of the article to the Department of Energy, and the government
responded by filing suit to enjoin publication. The government was faced
with a difficult case: Morland had not gained access to any classified or
restricted material, and everything in the article, indeed, had been gleaned
either from public sources or represented Morland's own analysis and
guesswork. This placed the government in the awkward position of arguing
that it was necessary to block publication because it contained "certain
316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003) ("To delve further into Hamdi's status and capture would
require us to step so far out of our role as judges that we would abandon the distinctive deference
that animates this area of law." (emphasis added)); N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 219 ("To the
extent that the Attorney General's national security concerns seem credible, we will not lightly
second-guess them."); Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 707 ("[W]e defer to theirjudgment. These
agents are certainly in a better position to understand the contours of the investigation . . .");
Padilla ex ret. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("[D]eference is due
because of a principle captured in another 'statement of Justice Jackson-that we decide
difficult cases presented to us by virtue of our commissions, not our competence.'" (quoting
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981))).
235. United States v. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
236. Ian M. Dumain, No Secret, No Defense: United States v. Progressive, 26 CARDOzO L. REv.
1323, 1325 (2005) (explaining that the goal of the Article was to "puncture the secrecy mystique
that surrounded nuclear weapons" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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concepts never heretofore disclosed in conjunction with one another."237 In
other words, it was Morland's own work-his synthesis, his analysis-that
made the information within the article dangerous.
Faced with reams of conflicting affidavits and expert testimony debating
the actual danger to national security of the challenged information, the
Progressive court ultimately ruled in favor of the government and rested its
holding on a series of unsubstantiated possibilities of dubious likelihood.
The court wrote, "[T] he article could possibly provide sufficient information to
allow a medium size nation to move faster in developing a hydrogen
weapon. It could provide a ticket to by-pass blind alleys. The Morland piece
could accelerate the membership of a candidate nation in the thermonuclear
club. ''21 In the face of such ambiguity, the central thrust of the court's
argument was the magnitude of the threatened catastrophe, and it dwelled
upon that dreadful potential with all the vehemence that cognitive science
would predict: "What is involved here is information dealing with the most
destructive weapon in the history of mankind, information of sufficient
destructive potential to nullify the right to free speech and to endanger the
right to life itself."23 9 And, thus, without any real discussion of the probability
that the Morland article would indeed cause harm-without so much as a
nod in the direction of a probability threshold-the court hung its decision
upon the vast disparity between the magnitudes of the cost and benefit that
this expression offered, not the statistically likely outcome:
A mistake in ruling against The Progressive will seriously infringe
cherished First Amendment rights. . . . It will infringe upon our
right to know and to be informed as well.
A mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for
thermonuclear annihilation for us all. In that event, our right to
life is extinguished and the right to publish becomes moot.
4 °
Once the court decided to balance along these lines, the case's resolution
could not but quickly follow.
But how dangerous could the Progressive article really have been?
Morland was not a scientist or engineer; he was an anti-nuclear activist.24' He
did not even have a scientific degree. After majoring briefly in physics, he
eventually graduated from Emory University with a Bachelor's degree in
economics.242 His modest military experience did not include any special
237. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 993; see also id. at 995 ("[N]ot all the data is available in the
public realm in the same fashion, if it is available at all." (emphasis added)).
238. Id. at 993-94 (emphasis added).
239. Id. at 995.
240. Id. at 996.
241. HOwARD MORLAND, THE SECRET THAT EXPLODED 35-37 (1981).
242. Id. at 23.
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technical training; he flew C-130 transport planes in Vietnam and had come
into contact with nuclear weapons only once, when he witnessed a
24'demonstration of how to load hydrogen bombs onto planes. Whatever
analysis or intuition had transformed publicly available information into
nationally sensitive data had been the work of little more than an intelligent
layperson. The notion that a foreign government seeking to acquire the
hydrogen bomb could not have easily achieved the same results is
preposterous on its face.
2 44
Sure enough, Morland's article was wrong on the essential details. A
fusion reaction is triggered when isotopes of hydrogen are heated and
compressed with great force, causing them to fuse together-hence the
name of the weapon.2 45 This was common knowledge when Morland wrote
his article, as was the fact that a fission reaction (a "standard" nuclear bomb)
is needed to cause the compression. 246 What was mysterious was the
mechanism by which the fission reaction would apply the compressing force
to the fusile materials. Morland's original article, which the government
sought to suppress, stated that the inside of the bomb casing was filled with
"thousands of finely machined reflecting surfaces" that would redirect and
center x-rays produced by the fission reaction on the hydrogen bomb's fusile
,,247core, crushing it with "radiation pressure.
Morland's hypothesis was entirely off-base, as the government later
admitted.248 An essential component of a fusion weapon is "an exotic, high-
density polystyrene-type foam" that absorbs the blast of the fission reaction
and transfers it to the fusile materials, triggering the fusion reaction. 249 The
"reflecting surfaces" were a figment of Morland's imagination. Morland's
article would not have provided a shortcut to the creation of a hydrogen
bomb; it would have produced a setback, as any nation or group that tried to
follow it spent valuable time and resources chasing down what both sides of
the case soon realized were dead-ends.250
243. Id. at 24.
244. Nor could it have been of much value that Morland had collected all of the relevant
sources. A thorough literature search requires negligible effort in comparison to the greater
project of producing a nuclear weapon. See Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 993 ("A number of
affidavits make quite clear that a sine qua non to thermonuclear capability is a large,
sophisticated industrial capability coupled with a coterie of imaginative, resourceful scientists
and technicians. One does not build a hydrogen bomb in the basement.").
245. A. DEVOLPI ET AL., BORN SECRET: THE H-BOMB, THE PROGRESSIVE CASE, AND NATIONAL
SECURITY 84 (1981).
246. Id.
247. Howard Morland, The H-bomb Secret, PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 9-10.
248. Id.
249. Howard Morland, Errata, PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 35.
250. See Dumain, supra note 236, at 1335 ("Perhaps surprisingly, all parties to The
Progressive case agreed that there were significant inaccuracies in Morland's article."). In
hindsight, Morland's errors are almost laughably dramatic. On the second page of his article,
he explained breathlessly that "[r]adiation pressure-a term never mentioned in the open
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A near-contemporaneous technical analysis of Morland's work arrived
at the same conclusion. The Progressive article drew substantially from an
article on the hydrogen bomb (containing various diagrams) published in
the 1974 edition of the Encyclopedia Americana; the author of this
encyclopedia article was none other than the eminent physicist Edward
Teller, often considered the father of the American hydrogen bomb.2 5'
Though it may have appeared at first glance that Morland had expanded
upon Teller's work, an examination by four scientists at Argonne National
Laboratory demonstrated that this, in fact, was not the case:
Morland's diagrams, although conceptual, appear to contain
considerably more information than the less detailed Teller
diagrams. But do they? . .. [T]he information in the Morland
article is scarcely more significant than the Teller diagram, in the
sense that everything in Morland's work can be deduced from the
Teller diagram or is incorrect or irrelevant, or speculative in the
sense that a large experimental program would be needed for
252
verification.
Any competent physicist, explained these Argonne scientists, could have
253quickly produced the same results. Their conclusion is stark: "It was self-
deluding to believe that Morland's article would have accelerated
proliferation ....,,254
The reader may wonder why the only reported opinion in this case
comes from a district court. Three days after the case was argued to the
Seventh Circuit, the Madison Press Connection published a letter from another
amateur nuclear enthusiast that described the operation of a fusion weapon,
255including the essential role of this foam.  In response to this letter-one
that differed from Morland's article in this crucial particular (among other
discrepancies)-the government "conceded that the secret was indeed out"
and "announced that it was abandoning its case. ", 56 In other words, the
government's case that Morland's article posed a danger to national security
was mooted by the disclosure of information contained nowhere within his
work. The government never offered a satisfactory explanation as to what
about Morland's incorrect description threatened the nation's security.
literature-is the essence of what remains of the H-bomb secret." Morland, supra note 247.
Perhaps the reason that "radiation pressure" had never made it into the open literature was that
it was completely irrelevant to the construction of a fusion weapon.
251. DEVOLPI ET AL., supra note 245, at 91.
252. Id. at 91-92.
253. Id. at 108-09.
254. Id. at 130.
255. Dumain, supra note 236, at 1331-32.
256. Id.
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It seems almost certain that the government's proffer of proof would
have failed the probability thresholds inherent to the Schenck/Brandenburg
and prior-restraint doctrines had the court faithfully applied those doctrines.
Additionally, adherence to the doctrines that operationalize the thresholds
at least would have focused the court's attention on the minimal (or non-
existent) increase in the probability of harm catalyzed by the article, rather
than the tremendous magnitude of the threat that drove the court's
decision. The result of this failure to implement the probability threshold
might well have been the suppression of valuable speech that would have
lessened the threat of nuclear war, not increased it. Howard Morland's
stated purpose in penning his article had been to expose how easily an
enemy nation might gather the information necessary to build a hydrogen
bomb and, thus, to spur the U.S. government to act more effectively to
prevent nuclear proliferation-without actually aiding any foreign nation in
producing such a weapon.15' By writing a piece that drew attention to this
issue but erred on critical questions, Morland may have succeeded in
achieving precisely that purpose had the court not blocked publication of
his work.
B. THE MODERN WAR ON TERROR AND
THE DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION
1. The INS Detainee Cases
The judiciary's willingness to rely solely upon highly doubtful-either
extremely low-probability or entirely non-existent-prospective harms is not
a relic of the Cold War era of nuclear tension. Such an attitude of
capitulation in the face of threats at the very end of the probability tail was
again manifest in North Jersey Media v. Ashcrof?5 8 and Detroit Free Press v.
Ashcroft, 9 recent Third and Sixth Circuit decisions that upheld the
Immigration and Naturalization Service's ("INS") closure of "special
interest" INS deportation hearings to the public and the media against First
Amendment challenges. 26° The executive branch had deemed these
257. Morland, supra note 249, at 34.
258. N.Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
259. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
260. The plaintiffs in each case brought suit under Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980), which held that "the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees
of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have
exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press could be
eviscerated.'" Id. at 580 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)). In both cases, the
trial courts extended such rights to INS deportation hearings (which have many of the qualities
of criminal trials) and held that the government must demonstrate a compelling interest if it
wished to close the hearings. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 943-46 (E.D.
Mich. 2002) (indicating that while the plaintiffs had a right of access in this case, the "press'
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hearings "special" in the sense that they involved individuals that the
Department of Justice had decided "might have connections to or
knowledge of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks."261 As justification
for barring access to the hearings, the Department of Justice asserted a
number of national-security concerns, each of which relied on a
combination of factors or pieces of information that might be employed in
tandem by terrorist organizations. The government postulated (and the
courts accepted the conclusion) that open hearings might reveal
clues that may allow them to thwart the government's efforts to
investigate and prevent future acts of violence.... [Open hearings]
might allow the organization to know that the United States is not
yet aware of the attack based on the evidence it presents at the
open hearing. . . . [Additionally,] if a terrorist organization
discovers that a particular member is detained, or that information
about a plot is known, it may accelerate the timing of a planned
attack, thus reducing the amount of time the government has to
detect and prevent it.
262
The courts acknowledged that these putative harms were
probabilistically uncertain, even as framed by the government.263 Yet, the
likelihood that allowing the public access to these deportation hearings
might place the nation's security in danger was not merely uncertain, it was
demonstrably miniscule.
In both Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media, the trial courts already
had observed that these hypothetical national-security dangers might come
to pass even under a regime of closed hearings. The detainees' attorneys
(who had access to the detainees and would be present at the deportation
hearings) were permitted to speak to the press and pass along any
information they desired, irrespective of the fact that the hearings were
closed to the public and to the media. As the District of New Jersey
explained:
The problem with the [government's plan for closing the hearings]
is that there is nothing in it to prevent disclosure of this very
information by the "special interest" detainee or that individual's
lawyer, both of whom are permitted to be present in the "special
and public's right is not absolute"), affd, 303 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey Media Group,
Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301 (D.N.J. 2002), rev'd, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002)).
261. N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 199.
262. Id. at 218.
263. Id. at 219 ("The Newspapers are undoubtedly correct that the representations of the
Watson Declaration are to some degree speculative, at least insofar as there is no concrete
evidence that closed deportation hearings have prevented, or will prevent, terrorist attacks.").
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interest" proceedings. Furthermore, if an appeal is taken, the
transcript of the proceedings below would be disclosed in any event.
264
Any enterprising terrorist who cared sufficiently about the subjects of these
hearings would have been able to assemble the same information via the
subsequent paper record-and likely at lower cost, since the terrorist would
not be required to attend every hearing, a practice that would have required
significant expenditures of time and effort and subjected the terrorist to the
threat of detection.
The two circuit courts compounded their errors by largely accepting the
Department of Justice's allegations of harm at face value, despite the fact
that the lower courts had already exposed the logical flaws contained within
them. The circuit courts refused to scrutinize the government's assertions,
pleading judicial ignorance in the face of superior executive expertise. As
the Sixth Circuit explained, "Inasmuch as these agents' declarations
establish that certain information revealed during removal proceedings
could impede the ongoing anti-terrorism investigation, we defer to their
judgment."'2 65  This disengagement with the government's proffered
rationales exacerbates the quandary that the probability threshold was
meant to counter-an improbable governmental warning of danger,
unexamined by judicial gatekeepers, might be employed by the government
at any moment as justification for inhibiting speech.
The facts of these cases-and indeed, the district courts' treatment of
those facts-reveal that, at best, only very slight marginal gains were available
from sealing the hearings. The idea that any national-security risk might
accrue beyond that already present seemed highly improbable. (Recall that
the operative probability when conducting a cost-benefit analysis is not the
simple chance that another act of terrorism will occur but the increase in
probability of such an attack as a result of allowing the First Amendment
activity to proceed.) Nonetheless, the Third and Sixth Circuits permitted the
INS to shutter the deportation hearings, privileging dubious claims of harm
in contravention of the probability threshold.
264. N. Jersey Media, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 301 (emphasis added); see also Detroit Free Press, 195 F.
Supp. 2d at 947. The Michigan district court found that:
Each of the interests the government relies upon addresses the dangers associated
with disclosing the name of the detainee, as well as the date and place of the
detainee's arrest. With respect to the present matter, however, that information
was made public from the outset.... Furthermore, neither in the Creppy directive
nor elsewhere does the Government prohibit detainees in special interest cases (or
their counsel or families) from revealing that info-mation to the press and public.
Id.
265. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 707 ("These agents are certainly in a better position to
understand the contours of the investigation and the intelligence capabilities of terrorist
organizations."); see also N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 219.
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2. Centerfor National Security Studies
Contemporaneously with the closures of INS deportation hearings that
gave rise to Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media, a number of independent
organizations filed Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")266 requests with
the Department of Justice, seeking disclosure of the names of all individuals
"detained in the wake of the September l1th terrorist attacks." 267 The
Department ofJustice denied those requests, claiming that such information
was exempted from disclosure under FOIA's statutory terms. 268 A FOIA
request is, of course, not equivalent to a First Amendment claim. But the
principles underlying each type of case are the same: the court must balance
the value to the public of forcing the government to release certain
information against the statistically likely harm that might result. And by its
very terms, FOIA imposes what looks very much like a doctrinal probability
threshold. Under FOIA (as it is relevant to this terrorism case), the
government may classify (and withhold) only:
(7) [R]ecords compiled for law enforcement purposes, or
information which if written could be contained in such records,
[that] . . . (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings . . . (C) could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy . . .or (F)
could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of
269
any individual.
In Center for National Security Studies v. U.S. Department ofJustice, the D.C.
270Circuit refused to order the government to disclose this information.
Providing the names of detainees, explained the court, could interfere with
the government's prosecution of the war on terrorism in several ways:
[T]he declarations state that release of the requested information
could hamper the ongoing investigation by leading to the
identification of detainees by terrorist groups, resulting in terrorists
either intimidating or cutting off communication with the
detainees; by revealing the progress and direction of the ongoing
investigation, thus allowing terrorists to impede or evade the
investigation; and by enabling terrorists to create false or
misleading evidence."'
Just as in the INS detainee cases, the court did not stop to consider that
"each of the detainees has had access to counsel, access to the courts, and
266. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2005).
267. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 331 F.3d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
268. Id.
269. 5 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(7)(A), (C), & (F) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
270. Ctr.for Nat' Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 937.
271. Id. at 923.
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freedom to contact the press or the public at large" and, thus, that the
prisoners themselves were at liberty to reveal all of the facts the Department of
272Justice maintained were so essentially worth guarding.
Terrorists probably would value an organized list of post-September
11th detainees more than they would the opportunity to attend the INS
hearings at issue in North Jersey Media and Detroit Free Press. Because such a list
has the virtue of aggregating all of the relevant information, terrorists would
not be required to gather the data themselves, as they would in the case of
either open or closed detainee hearings. Such a list might, therefore, induce
a greater increase in the marginal probability of harm than would the
opening of the INS hearings. Nonetheless, the marginal value of concealing
this information from the public when it might easily escape through other
channels was quite small, surely much smaller than the court of appeals was
willing to admit.
The reason for the court's decision likely lay within the "magnitude"
component of the cost-benefit equation and the possibility that this release
could materialize into another terrorist attack. Judge David Tatel suggested
as much in dissent: "Neither FOIA itself nor this circuit's interpretation of
the statute authorizes the court to invoke the phrase 'national security' to
relieve the government of its burden of justifying its refusal to release
information under FOIA." 273 Yet, it was that mere invocation of "national
security" that allowed the executive to carry the day-the possibility of a
dreadful catastrophe weighed more heavily upon the court than the
statistically diminutive harm that the plaintiffs' FOIA request might have
been expected to produce. Where a probability threshold might have
weeded out this entirely improbable harm and denied it constitutional force
(at least without further evidence to support it), the court's unadulterated
adventure in balancing resulted in the suppression of speech that very well
may have passed the cost-benefit threshold.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past decades, cost-benefit analysis has assumed an essential or
even dominant position within both private- and public-law decisional
analysis. Commentators have naturally extended cost-benefit analysis's reach
to a variety of constitutional provisions that appear to call, either
conceptually or doctrinally, for an explicit balancing of harms and benefits.
Foremost among these fields is the First Amendment freedom of speech,
which in many of the most important, borderline cases would seem to
demand retail balancing of the harms and benefits that a particular act of
speech is likely to generate. Commentators have thus read into the First
272. Id. at 922.
273. Id. at 939 (Tatel,J., dissenting).
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Amendment a demand for precisely this type of straightforward cost-benefit
analysis.
Yet the pivotal speech doctrines, as expounded by the Supreme Court,
have taken quite a different direction. Rather than requiring unadulterated
cost-benefit balancing, the clear and present danger, incitement, fighting
words, and prior-restraints doctrines-which together encompass nearly all
of the critical cases testing speech against the interests of civil peace and
national security-incorporate probability thresholds: floors that define how
likely a potential threat must be before it gains constitutional significance
and the government can employ it as a justification for suppressing speech.
Putative dangers of extremely high magnitude and extraordinarily low
probability-contextually improbable wars, riots, or acts of terrorism, for
instance-are screened out and shunted aside.
This doctrinal wrinkle presents a puzzle, as it would seem to protect a
class of speech acts that would fail an even-handed welfare calculation. But
there exists a triptych of reasons to distrust the conclusions that courts might
reach were they allowed to balance harms and benefits at retail. First, the
government is likely to exaggerate the harms posed by speech in the course
of trying to prove its cases, and these inflated harms are more likely to come
in the form of low-probability, high-magnitude threats. Second, decision-
makers are prone to grave cognitive errors of estimation in the presence of
very small probabilities, and when applied to high-magnitude threats, these
small errors can have enormous consequences. And third, potential high-
magnitude, low-probability harms-wars, riots, acts of terrorism, and the
like-are frequently dreadful, fearsome events. Such potential threats tend
to provoke strong emotional responses and trigger overwrought reactions
from the individuals who must make decisions in their shadow, further
skewing the results of such decision-making away from the proper balance
between speech and security.
The low-probability threshold acts as a second-best corrective to these
problems, screening out those improbable dangers that are most likely to
lead courts astray. The alternative-the type of retail balancing that some
lower courts stubbornly persist in performing-is a jurisprudence rife with
systematic error, as United States v. Progressive and cases from the modern war
on terrorism demonstrate. The First Amendment's probability threshold
may be a crude corrective, but it serves as a necessary antidote to our
natural-and systematically flawed-cognitive tendencies.
The probability threshold is visible particularly at the boundaries of the
First Amendment because the cases at the fringes of those doctrines pose
most starkly the choice between the value of uninhibited speech and the
dangers that it presents. But many other fields of law have evolved in the
presence of common intuitions-if not sophisticated, empirical
understandings-of the cognitive errors to which individuals frequently
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succumb when confronting small numbers and events of extremely low
probability.
Probability thresholds, and other behavioral correctives, may thus exist
in many other areas of the law. For instance, commentators have linked such
disparate legal doctrines as the business judgment rule and the warrant
requirement to the threat of hindsight bias, i.e., the tendency of humans to
view an event that has already occurred as more probable (ex ante) than it
actually was.274 More particularly, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment may harbor yet-unearthed probability thresholds
that bar courts from engaging in unencumbered cost-benefit balancing.
Among the signature characteristics of equal protection's heightened
scrutiny doctrines is the principle that unproven, hypothesized
governmental rationales will not suffice as justifications for upholding
presumptively invalid laws that classify people along impermissible lines. A
hypothetical justification, or one based on an unreliable prediction, will not
suffice; even in cases of intermediate scrutiny, the "significant government
interest" alleged must be known to exist to a relative certainty; it cannot be
"a judgment hardly proved, a prediction hardly different from other 'self-
fulfilling prophecies.'-
2 75
The importance in the Court's dismissal of the issue in such a manner
lies with the fact that no computation or balancing appears to be taking
place. The Court does not weigh the harm's or benefit's expected utility as
the product of its degree and probability. Rather, it simply disregards it as
too improbable to warrant serious consideration. Further research will be
required to explore these avenues of inquiry, and the modern behavioral
picture of how humans make legally significant decisions demands nothing
less.
Over the past decades, law and economics principles have established a
place of prominence in private law and regulatory scholarship and a strong
foothold in many fields of constitutional law. Courts presented with difficult
close cases have turned toward law and economics for guidance as to when
and how to balance the competing harms and benefits of constitutionally
protected activities. Important work has been done to uncover those areas in
which doctrine mirrors and adopts the insights of law and economics.
274. See, e.g., Roselink Investors, L.L.C. v. Shenkman, 386 F. Supp. 2d 209, 224 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) ("[T]he business judgment rule is intended to protect directors against just such attacks
because their decisions are not to be second-guessed by courts with the benefit of hindsight.");
William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REv. 881, 911 (1991) ("In
almost any after-the-fact system of adjudication, decisionmakers must determine whether
behavior was appropriate after they know how the behavior turned out.").
275. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542-43 (1996) (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982)). The implication is that, regardless of the potential level of
harm (and in Virginia, the government's witnesses had predicted nothing less than the
destruction of the very character and importance of the Virginia Military Institute), the harm
must reach a certain (high) level of probability for it even to become judicially cognizable.
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Important work remains in discovering and critiquing those spheres in
which doctrine deviates from the standard predictions of law and economics
and draws upon even deeper insights into the contours of boundedly
rational decision-making.
RSH
